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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
1988 CANADA--UNITED
STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE

On January 2, 1988, the President of the United States and the Prime
Minister of Canada signed the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA).' It was implemented by appropriate legislation in both countries 2 and came into force on January 1, 1989. This Agreement is the most
comprehensive of a series of projects and treaties on free trade between
Canada and the United States over the last 135 years.3
The objectives of the FTA are to:
a) eliminate barriers to trade in goods and services between the
territories of the Parties;
b) facilitate conditions of fair competition within the free-trade area;
c) liberalize significantly conditions for investment within this freetrade area;
d) establish effective procedures for the joint administration of this
Agreement and the resolution of disputes; and
e) lay the foundation for further bilateral and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.4
To achieve these objectives, the FTA provides for liberalization in all
sectors of the economy, including agriculture and energy. It adopts the
principle of national treatment as the basic norm. In sum, the FTA sets a
new standard for trade agreements, as it builds on the parties' mutual rights
and obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), other multilateral and bilateral arrangements, and ad hoc undertakings.5 By regulating economic interdependence, the FTA should increase prosperity in both countries.
The maintenance of a harmonious relationship between states bound by
an international trade agreement requires procedures to avoid conflicts
and, should they arise, to resolve them quickly and effectively to the satisfaction of the parties involved. Such procedures usually take the form of notification of the trade measures one of the contracting states is planning to
I H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1988), reprinted in 27 ILM 281 (1988)
[hereinafter FTA]. Note that some of its provisions will come into force progressively over a
10-year period. See Art. 401, Tariff elimination.
2 In the United States, see United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, especially title IV, §§401-410, 102 Stat. 1851; in Canada,
see Bill C-2, An Act to Implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United
States of America, 34th Parl., 1st Sess. (1988) (royal assent, Dec. 30, 1988).
' For a historical survey, see Farr, "Inner Meaning" of Free Trade, INT'L PERSP., No. 4,
July/August 1988, at 3.
2
' FTA, Art. 102; see also Preamble.
Id., Arts. 105 and 501.
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adopt that may affect the other contracting states, and consultation and
direct negotiation with respect to such measures prior to their enactment,
followed by mediation, good offices or conciliation by third parties, if necessary. If conciliation or direct negotiation does not resolve the potential or
actual conflict, resolution of the dispute by binding arbitration or some
other method of adjudication may ensue. Finally, should the losing party
refuse to comply with the award or decision, sanctions such as compensation, retaliation or termination of the agreement may be imposed. The FTA
follows some of these procedures in chapters 18 and 19, which deal with
institutional provisions and binational dispute settlement in antidumping
and countervailing duty cases.6 However, the FTA takes a more legalistic or
rule-oriented approach than the GATT. The procedures are also more
comprehensive. Emphasis is placed on the enforcement of obligations rather
than on the resolution of disputes through negotiation and consensus.
Therefore, the FTA meets some of the criticisms addressed to the GATT
procedures7 and could serve as a model for the nations participating in the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
InstitutionalProvisions
Chapter 18 deals with the institutional provisions for the joint management of the FTA and applies to the avoidance or settlement of all disputes
between the parties regarding the interpretation or application of the
Agreement. It also applies whenever a party considers that an actual or
proposed measure of the other party is or would be inconsistent with the
' See also a few provisions scattered throughout the FTA: Art. 303 (consultation with respect
to rules of origin for goods); Ann. 406.6 (consultation concerning the uniform application of
rules of origin for goods); Ann. 406.7 (appeals relating to rules of origin); Ann. 406.9 (notification and consultation prior to major changes in the flow of trade); Art. 709 (consultation on
agricultural issues); Ann. 705.4(1 0-19) (institutional procedures and arbitration panels re local
support for wheat); Art. 1103 (emergency action, arbitration); Art. 1406 (services, denial of
benefits); Ann. 1404.B, Art. 4 (tourism, consultation); Art. 1504 (temporary entry for business
persons, dispute settlement); Art. 1608 (investment disputes); Art. 1704 (financial services,
notification and consultation).
' For an analysis of the settlement of disputes under the GATT, especially Articles XXII and
XXIII, see Annex to the 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance [hereinafter 1979 Understanding], GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter BISD], 26th Supp. 215 (1978-79); supplemented by
the 1979 Understanding, id. at 210; and the 1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement, BISD, 29th Supp. 13 (1982). The non-tariff-barriers agreements negotiated in the
Tokyo Round also contain provisions for the settlement of disputes. Some of them follow more
or less the model of the 1979 Understanding. Others contain new and more elaborate and
rigorous procedures. Still others adopt specific procedures, although reference is also made to
Articles XXII and XXIII. Finally, some lack detailed procedures. See generally J. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 164 (1969); 0. LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN
THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1985); R. HUDEc, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975); R. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL

TRADE DISPUTES (1978); Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the United States,
in 4 STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 187 (1986); Hudec, GATT Dispute Settle-

ment After the Tok'yo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980); Davey,
DisputeSettlement in GATT. 1 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987).
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obligations of the FTA, or would cause nullification or impairment in the
sense of Article 201 1,8 unless the parties agree to use another procedure in
any particular case. Disputes that arise under both the FTA and the GATT
and agreements under them may be settled in either forum, according to
the rules of that forum, at the discretion of the complaining party. Once the
procedure for the settlement of a dispute has been initiated under the FTA
or the GATT, it must be used to the exclusion of any other.' The essential
features of the FTA institutional provisions are economy, joint decision
making and effective dispute resolution. By giving each partner an equal
voice in resolving problems through authoritative interpretations of the
FTA, it is hoped that fairness, predictability and security will be achieved.
Chapter 18, which does not apply to financial services and binational dispute
settlement in antidumping and countervailing duty cases, provides for:
(1) the mandatory notification by each country of any proposed or

actual measure that it considers might materially affect the operation of
the FTA;
(2) the obligation to give information and respond to questions pertaining to any actual or proposed measure, whether or not previously
notified;"0
(3) consultation at the request of either party concerning any measure or any other matter that affects the operation of the FTA, with a
view to arriving at a mutually satisfactory resolution;"
(4) referral to the Canada-United States Trade Commission should
resolution through consultation fail; 2 and
(5) resort to procedures for the settlement of disputes should the
Commission fail to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution.
These procedures are as follows.

Binding arbitrationon such terms as the Canada-UnitedStates Trade Commission may adopt. Arbitration is compulsory' 3 and binding on both parties for
FTA, Art. 2011 provides:
F
1. If a Party considers that the application ofany measure, whether or not such measure
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, causes nullification or impairment of any
benefit reasonably expected to accrue to that Party, directly or indirectly under the
provisions of this Agreement, that Party may, with a view to the satisfactory resolution of
the matter, invoke the consultation provisions of Article 1804 and, if' it considers it
appropriate, proceed to dispute settlement pursuant to Articles 1805 and 1807 or, with
the consent of the other Party, proceed to arbitration pursuant to Article 1806.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to Chapter Nineteen and Article 2005
[cultural industries].
9

1d., Art. 1801(1-3).
"I'd., Art. 1803.
"I
d., Art. 1804.
2
'1 d., Art. 1805. The Commission, which is not a supranational independen authority but a
binational politicized nonpermanent institution, has wide-ranging management responsibilities
that include supervising the implementation of the Agreement, overseeing its further elaboration and considering any matter that affects its operation. Id., Art. 1802(1). Its powers of
notification, consultation, arbitration, negotiation and decision with respect to highly contentious and politically sensitive issues will make decisions by consensus almost impossible.
'1d., Art. 1806(1)(a).
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disputes arising from the interpretation and application of the safeguards
provisions of the FTA.' 4 This procedure is not found in the GATT or in any
other international agreement. For any other dispute, the parties may agree
to binding arbitration.'" The FTA further provides:
If a Party fails to implement in a timely fashion the findings of a binding
arbitration panel and the Parties are unable to agree on appropriate
compensation or remedial action, then the other Party shall have the
right to suspend the application of equivalent benefits of this Agreement to the non-complying Party. 6
Panel procedures. When this method of dispute settlement is used, the
panel makes recommendations to the Canada-United States Trade Commission, which in turn is mandated to agree on the resolution of the dispute. 17 Whenever possible, the resolution shall be by removing or not implementing a measure at variance with the FTA or causing its nullification
or impairment, or failing such a resolution, by awarding compensation."8 If
the Commission cannot reach agreement on a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute within 30 days of receiving the panel's final report, or
such other date as the Commission may decide, and a party considers that its
fundamental rights under the FTA or benefits anticipated under it are or
would be impaired by the implementation or maintenance of the measure at
issue, that party shall be free to suspend the application to the other party of
benefits of equivalent effect until the parties have reached agreement on the
resolution of the dispute.' 9
Arbitrators are to be selected by the Commission on such terms and in
accordance with such procedures as it may adopt." Nevertheless, detailed
rules deal with the composition of panels, the general principles they must
follow and the time allotted to them. Panelists are normally to be chosen
from a roster maintained by the Commission.2 The panel is free to establish
its rules of procedure unless the Commission has agreed otherwise. The
procedure adopted must assure a right to at least one hearing before the
panel as well as the opportunity to provide written submissions and rebuttals." The proceedings of the panel will be confidential.2 3
Paragraphs 5 to 7 of Article 1807 provide as follows:
5. Unless the Parties otherwise agree, the panel shall, within three
months after its chairman is appointed, present to the Parties an initial
report containing findings of fact, its determination as to whether the
measure at issue is or would be inconsistent with the obligations of this
Agreement or cause nullification and impairment in the sense of Article
ld., Art. 1103 (e.g., emergency or escape clause actions pursuant to Art. XIX of the
I4
GATT).
Id.,
Art. 1806(1)(b).
"31d., Art. 1806(3).
7Id., Art. 1807.
"Id., Art. 1807(8).
'"ld., Art. 1807(9). Note that under the FTA, contrary to GATT practice, consent of the
defendant is not required before a panel is established by the Commission. See 1979 Understanding, supra note 7, para. 11.
2" FTA, Art. 1806(l).
21 Id., Art. 1807(1).
23
22 Id., Art. 1807(4).
Id.
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2011, and its recommendations, if any, for resolution of the dispute.
Where feasible, the panel shall afford the Parties opportunity to comment on its preliminary findings of fact prior to completion of its report. If requested by either Party at the time of establishment of the
panel, the panel shall also present findings as to the degree of adverse
trade effect on the other Party of any measure found not to conform
with the obligations of the Agreement. Panelists may furnish separate
opinions on matters not unanimously agreed.
6. Within 14 days of issuance of the initial report of the panel, a
Party disagreeing in whole or in part shall present a written statement
of its objections and the reasons for those objections to the Commission
and the panel. In such an event, the panel on its own motion or at the
request of the Commission or either Party may request the views of
both Parties, reconsider its report, make any further examination that
it deems appropriate and issue a final report, together with any separate
opinions, within 30 days of issuance of the initial report.
7. Unless the Commission agrees otherwise, the final report of the
panel shall be published along with any separate opinions, and any
written views that either Party desires to be published.
If these procedures under chapter 18 of the FTA are viewed against those
of the GATT, the following conclusions may be drawn. Provisions like those
in the FTA on compulsory or mutually agreed binding arbitration are not to
be found in the GATT and should ensure better compliance with the FTA
rules than would the GATT procedures. In addition, the FTA requirement
of prior notification is a significant improvement over the GATT, which
lacks mandatory prior notification.
The remedies given to an aggrieved party, that is, compensation, remedial action or suspension of the application of equivalent benefits, are substantially similar to those found in the GATT.24 Of course, retaliation may

not prove effective against the United States, as 80 percent of Canadian
exports are to the United States. Short of sanctions, an unrealistic possibility, Canada will have to rely upon the good faith of its partner.
Blockage may still take place under the FTA, as the Commission must
agree on a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute; normally, however, it should conform with the recommendation of the panel. Panel reports may only be delayed temporarily since consensus is not required.
Thus, the FTA procedure should prove more effective than the GATT's
because of the possibility that the aggrieved party will temporarily suspend
the application of benefits of equivalent effect when the Commission cannot
reach agreement on a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute after
receiving the panel's report. This overcomes blockage of a panel report.
Also unlike the GATT, 5 the FTA does not require authorization before
retaliation can take place. These limitations on the possible blocking by one
party of the adoption of panel decisions are a positive aspect of the FTA
procedures for the settlement of disputes.
24

GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5), (6), TIAS No. 1700, 55-61 UNTS, Art. XXIII.
Art. XXIII(2).

25 Id.,
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The provisions of the FTA dealing with panel procedures are an improve-

ment over those found in the GATT. Time limits are much shorter both
with respect to the appointment of panelists and for the presentation of the
initial report to the parties, although in the latter case, 3 months may be too
little for the panels to engage in fact-finding and to consider the parties'
arguments. The FTA also attempts to reduce delays in the adoption of
reports by the panels and by the Commission. Finally, the qualifications
required of panelists are more exacting than those under the GATT.2"
They should ensure competence, neutrality and reasoned analysis of dis-

putes, resulting in wider acceptance of the panel reports.
There is no provision in chapter 18 for participation by private parties
and the provinces. This is consistent with principles of international law and

GATT practice.
Generally speaking, some of the procedures for the settlement of disputes
found in chapter 18, such as notification and consultation, are similar to
those in the GATT; others, such as the establishment of a joint commission

and binding arbitration, are unique.
Antidum ping and CountervailingDuty Cases
Chapter 19 deals with binational dispute settlement in antidumping and
countervailing duty cases.
Development of a substitute system. The FTA, which does not change the
existing substantive law, obliges Canada and the United States to develop,
over a 5- to 7-year period, mutually advantageous rules applicable to government subsidies and private anticompetitive pricing practices such as
dumping.17 Until then, each party retains its domestic laws and reserves the
right to apply them to goods imported from the territory of the other
party." In the light of the conflicting interests of Canada and the United
States with respect to the use of subsidies, and the difficult task of reaching
agreement on the definition and list of permissible and nonpermissible
subsidies, especially those that are established for domestic purposes and
may only incidentally affect international trade, it is unlikely that more
rigorous substantive rules governing subsidies will be adopted otherwise
than through the GATT, or perhaps by using the 1979 Subsidies Code
adopted at the Tokyo Round as a model to be built upon.2 9 Moreover, to
develop substitute rules, the United States and Canada will also have to
reach agreement on the definitions of "material injury" and "standing,"
and on the thorny issues of regional development programs, "net subsidies," 0 "general availability" as an indicator of the effect of a subsidy on
2"See 1979 Understanding, supra note 7,paras. 13-14.
2
27 FTA, Arts. 1906-1907.
1ld., Art. 1902(1).
" Canada and the United States are parties to the international antidumping code (Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr.
12, 1979, 31 UST 4919, TIAS No. 9650) and the Agreement on subsidies and countervailing
duties (Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 UST 513, TIAS No. 9619).
'"Where the petitioner was the recipient of subsidies.
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international trade, preferential interest rates, and research and development programs.
In the absence of true protection, temporizing by way of litigation will
remain the rule.3" This is unfortunate, as contingency protection by means
of subsidies and dumping is more distorting than tariff barriers. By creating
uncertainty, such means undermine the predictability and security that are
so essential to Canadian exporters and would-be investors. Dumping should
have no place in the FTA and should be subject exclusively to the domestic
competition laws of both parties because tariff elimination pursuant to the
Agreement will tend to make the separation of markets that is necessary for
dumping more difficult.
Disputes arisingfrom legislative changesin domestic law. Although the investigative and administering authorities of the parties to the FTA will continue
to enforce domestic antidumping and countervailing duty laws within their
jurisdiction, 2 and their legislatures may change these laws, the requirement
to notify the other party of proposed changes and to enter into prior consultations if so requested is a major improvement over the GATT and a
significant feature of the FTA. Such changes must be consistent with the
GATT antidumping and subsidies codes and with the object and purpose of
the FTA. 3 The fact that each party will be exempted from such legislative
changes unless otherwise specifically stated is another important feature of
the FTA not found in the GATT. 4 This provision will benefit Canada
significantly since it will automatically exempt it from U.S. legislative
changes directed at the perceived unfair trade practices of other states.
A binational panel may issue declaratory opinions with respect to such
legislative changes and recommend modifications. These opinions may de35
clare the changes to be contrary to the GATT or the FTA.
In the event a panel recommends modifications to existing or proposed
legislation, compulsory consultation must take place for 90 days, during
which period the parties must seek to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution that may include remedial legislation. Should such remedial legislation
not be introduced and enacted into law within 9 months and no other
solution be reached, the other party may take retaliatory action in the form
of legislation of comparable effect or equivalent executive action or may
terminate the Agreement on short notice, namely, 60 days. There is nothing similar in the GATT.
Disputes arisingfromfinal determinationsby domestic administeringauthorities.
The FTA provides for the replacement ofjudicial review by domestic courts
of final determinations concerning dumping, subsidization and material
injury. Instead, a binational panel will determine whether the laws of the
s See the controversy between the United States and the European Economic Community

over the common agricultural policy, analyzed by Hudec in Transcending the Ostensible: Some
Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments, 72 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1987).
12 The Agreement merely incorporates existing legal standards from the GATT.
11 Existing legislation is not subject to review to ascertain whether it conforms with the
GATT provisions.
35
34 FTA, Art. 1902.
Id., Art. 1903.
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importing country were applied correctly and fairly. 6 No option is given to
use the GATT procedures. 7 Preliminary determinations and most decisions to terminate an investigation will not be subject to binational panel
review. Even when such review is possible, the administering authorities
may retain their jurisdiction if the parties or their governments do not
request or initiate a panel review. In antidumping cases, it is most unlikely
that the United States or Canada will participate in a panel review unless
significant issues of principle are involved.
Elaborate provisions deal with the mechanics of such review by a panel. Its
findings will be binding on both parties. 8 If the panel finds that the administering authority has erred on the basis of the same standards as would have
been applied by a domestic court, it can send the issue back to the administering authority to correct the error and make a new determination. The
panel cannot substitute its decision for that of the administering authority.
Although this method of review of national decisions is unlikely to appeal to
the other members of the GATT, its availability should make trade regulators on both sides of the Canada-U.S. border more cautious about accepting
complaints by domestic producers and initiating investigations or issuing
preliminary determinations. The impartiality and objectivity of decisions
should also improve.
Panel decisions must be rendered within 315 days of the date on which a
request for a panel is made. 9 In this connection, the GATT procedures
would seem to be faster; for instance, without waiting for a preliminary
finding or a final determination by its authorities, the United States may
request consultation and eventually the establishment of a panel as soon as a
private party submits a petition to the Department of Commerce claiming
that Canada grants and maintains a subsidy that allegedly nullifies or impairs
a benefit accruing to the U.S. party. Of course, as noted previously, under
of resort to GATT procedures with respect
the FTA, there is no possibility
40
to subsidies and dumping.
A person that would otherwise be entitled under the law of the importing
party to commence domestic procedures for judicial review of a final deter41
mination would have the right to petition that party for review by a panel.
This person may also appear and be represented by counsel before the
panel.42 It should be noted that at present the GATT panel route avoids
legal costs for Canadian and United States private complainants since the
cases are handled by government officials. Under the FTA, this benefit
would only be realized after a final determination.
Panelists are to be chosen from a roster of persons who have previously
agreed to act in that capacity. The majority must be lawyers in good standing.43 Considering the strictly legal appellate review authority of panels, one
may question the presence of nonlawyers on them. Panelists must be accept37
Id., Art. 1801(1).
-61Id.,
Arts. 1904, 1911.
" Id.,
Art. 1904(9).
' Id., Art. 1904(14). Note that the GATT codes have time limits.
4
"Id.,
Art. 1801(1).
4 Id.,
Art. 1904(5).
" Id., Ann. 1901.2(1) and (2).
1*.
Id., Art. 1904(7).
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able to both sides. Each disputant has the right to exercise four peremptory
challenges of panelists chosen by the other side.44 This provision permits
more control over panel selection than in the GATT and makes the dispute
settlement system more adjudicative in nature.
In the case of miscarriage of justice, either government may inv6ke an
extraordinary challenge procedure that provides for a panel of three former
judges who are to determine whether or not the allegations are valid and
45
whether or not a new panel will be required to review the issues.
Finally, permanent secretariat offices are to be established to facilitate the
operation of this chapter of the FTA.46
The procedures just described will increase the risk of duplicative review
and inconsistent determinations as a result of parallel proceedings. For
instance, in cases involving a product imported from several countries, importers from the United States and Canada will be able to request the
binational panel review procedures, whereas ordinary remedies will be applicable to importers from other countries. The creation of a single, permanent binational panel would have been more desirable than the present
system of ad hoc panels for different types of dispute. Also, panel members
chosen on an ad hoc basis are less likely to have a comprehensive view of the
objectives of the Agreement.
There are no equivalent provisions for binding review in the GATT, the
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade4 7 and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade.48
Constitutionalityof Articles 1901-1911. Since the binational panels and extraordinary challenge committees are not courts of the United States but
international organs, their constitution under the FTA gives rise to some
constitutional questions. First, can final determinations of the Department
of Commerce and the United States International Trade Commission in
antidumping and countervailing duty cases only be reviewed by a United
States court established under section 1 of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, 49 and is only such a court capable of according due process of law to
persons before it? Although access to judicial review of administrative determinations in connection with imports into the United States has increased in
recent years, neither Congress nor the courts have considered it a constitutional right to be enforced by Article III courts. Furthermore, there is no
" Id., Ann. 1901.2(2).
46Id., Art. 1909.

45

Id., Art. 1904(13) and Ann. 1904.13.

47 See Arts. 17 and 18 of the Agreement, supra note 29.

18See Art. 15 of the Agreement, supra note 29.
49 U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." For a good review, see Statement of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement Binational Dispute Settlement Mechanism (May 20, 1988). See also H.R.
REP. No. 816(IV), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
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committee should
reason a binational panel or an extraordinary challenge
50
fail to meet the requirements of due process of law.
It has also been argued that the method of appointing the binational
panels and extraordinary challenge committees violates clause 2, section 2
of Article II of the U.S. Constitution,5 and that such panels would exercise
legislative powers in violation of section 1 of Article I, which vests in Congress all legislative powers granted by the Constitution. These arguments
can be dismissed, as the binational panels and extraordinary challenge committees are international organs similar to GATT dispute settlement panels.
Their U.S. members are not officers of the United States, especially since
they are prohibited from taking instructions from either party.5 2 When
giving declaratory opinions or reviewing final determinations, they will not
be exercising the legislative or judicial power of the United States since
these are not binding on Congress or the courts. Past history indicates
that membership of the United States in the United States-Canada Joint
other similar bodies does not raise any constituCommission and
53
tional challenge.
In Canada, chapters 18 and 19 of the FTA are unlikely to be challenged
on constitutional grounds. First, the decisions of the Canada-United States
Trade Commission are not binding on Canadian courts. Second, the creation of the binational panels and the extraordinary challenge committees
with respect to the review of final antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations is a matter within federal legislative competence. These
quasi-judicial international organs will simply be exercising some of the
review powers belonging to the Federal Court of Canada. Thus, since
chapters 18 and 19 do not infringe the jurisdiction and powers of provincial
superior courts, sections 96 to 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which deal
with the judicature, are not implicated.54
Conclusion
The provisions of the FTA on the settlement of disputes go far beyond
those of the GATT. Emphasis is placed on the rights and obligations of the
parties rather than on their economic or political power, which is under50

See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Scherk v. Alberto-

Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); and Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (where the claim was made and rejected that due process required
adjudication before a U.S. court established under Article III).
12 FTA, Ann. 1901.2(1).
3'Called the -'appointment clause."
3'E.g., the body established under the Treaty Relating to the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36
Stat. 2448, TS No. 548.
" British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, §§96-100, as amended. According
to these sections, a tribunal is invalidly constituted unless its members (1) are appointed by the
federal Government in conformity with §96; (2) are drawn from the bar of the province in
conformity with §§97 and 98; and (3) receive salaries that are fixed and provided by the federal
Parliament in conformity with §100. The better view is that these sections do not apply to
federal courts. See generally P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 150ff. (2d ed.
1985).
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standable when one considers who those parties are. Enforcement measures
under the FTA are stronger than those under the GATT, which emphasizes
the resolution of disputes rather than the enforcement of obligations. It is to
the credit of the United States that it accepted a formal system of dispute
settlement, as powerful nations are more interested in negotiated solutions
to disputes. Canada, as a small country economically, is better served by a
more legalistic model that stresses adjudication and the rule of law. Thus,
trade disputes between Canada and the United States should be processed
more efficiently under the FTA than they have been under the GATT,
which lacks a formal system of dispute settlement. On the whole, the FTA
procedures seem to achieve a sensible and reasonable balance between adjudication and negotiation.
The United States and Canada might jointly propose that some of these
procedures, especially binding arbitration with respect to emergency action
measures, be adopted by the GATT. Other FTA procedures, such as binding binational panel review of final determinations on countervailing duties
and dumping, seem to be more suited to the special Canada-United States
trade relationship.

J.-G. CASTEL*

A

NEW APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE

Introduction
A review of the current state of legal regulation in the field of human
rights is likely to give the disappointing impression that international legislation is unequal to the task of checking widespread disregard for human
dignity. Despite the vast proliferation of instruments setting standards on
human rights, imposing obligations as regards the observance of those
standards and establishing procedures to deal with breaches of those obligations, violations of human rights continue, their perpetrators apparently
undeterred.
The proliferation has mainly been of instruments dealing with particular
kinds of rights' or with particular groups of people requiring special treatment.2 This approach is clearly justified by the need to give more specific
content to the generalized terms of the "core" documents, particularly the
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
* Professor of International Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
'See, e.g., Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 81, 1953,27 UST 1909, TIAS
No. 8289, 193 UNTS 135; and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 UNTS 195.
2
See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of RefugeesJuly 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 137; and
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, GA Res. 1386, 14 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, UN
Doc. A/4354 (1959).
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1948 and the International Covenants of 1966. The recent instruments
thus attempt, on the one hand, to achieve and preserve consensus on how
the general standards are to apply in concrete situations and, on the other,
to ensure that no room is left for loopholes or disingenuous interpretations
of those standards.
These instruments clearly have important educational value; in setting
standards on human rights, they serve both to raise the level of people's
expectations as to how they should be treated and, to some extent, to raise
the level of treatment of individuals by governments. Those instruments
that establish some enforcement machinery can also have some effect, at
least in the long term, in discouraging gross violations of human rights.
Following judicial or quasi-judicial decisions confirming violations, national
laws and practices may eventually be changed for the better. Further, a
number of such instruments offer at least some possibility for recompense to
those who fall victim to human rights violations.'
Yet all these instruments lack machinery capable of enforcing compliance
in any systematic or rigorous way with the obligations they create. All too
frequently, they simply cannot stop violations; those international implementing and remedial measures which do exist do not appear to have a
sufficiently strong and direct deterrent effect. Plainly, in a sphere such as
human rights, where violations are in large measure irremediable, in the
sense that nothing can ever efface the victim's memory of suffering-and,
in many cases, its scars, physical or psychological-the key is prevention.
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Convention),4 concluded in
1987 under the aegis of the Council of Europe, marks a fresh, preventive
approach to the handling of human rights violations of a sort acutely in need
of containment. The Convention establishes a European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Committee);5 this body will have the right to conduct visits to any
- For instruments providing a right of individual complaint, see, e.g., Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, GA Res. 2200, 21 UN
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221, Art. 25
[hereinafter ECHR]; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, reprinted in
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN

SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.65, doc. 6, at 103

(1985), Art. 44.
"Opened for signature Nov. 26, 1987, Council of Europe Doc. H (87) 4, reprinted in 27 ILM
1152 (1988). See generally The European Draft Convention against Torture, 31 REV. INT'L COMM'N
JURISTS 50 (1983); Wickremasinghe, A radical step in the crusade against torture: the European
Convention, 2 INTERIGHTS BULL. 30 (1987); and Decaux, La Convention europienne pour la
prAention de ta torture et des peines ou traitenents inhumains ou digradants (to appear in 34
ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1988)); Vigny, La Convention europienne de
1987 pour la privention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou digradants, 43
ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 62 (1987). See also, concerning the Convention's approach to the problem of torture, Swiss COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, How TO
COMBAT TORTURE: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM, GENEVA, 1983 (1984).
5 Convention, Art. 1.
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place within the jurisdiction of the states parties where persons are deprived
of their liberty by a public authority, with a view to protecting such persons
from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 6

Both regular and ad hoc visits are envisaged.'
DraftingHistory

The origins of the Convention' can be traced back to a proposal in 1976
by Jean-Jacques Gautier, founder of the Swiss Committee against Torture.
Gautier, in turn, was inspired by the long-standing activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (the ICRC) in conducting visits to places
where prisoners of war are detained and, if necessary, making recommendations for the improvement of conditions there. The ICRC carries out these
visits on a confidential basis. The element of trust and cooperation between
the ICRC and the local authorities is seen as essential to their success.
However, the ICRC has the right to conduct such visits only when there is
an international armed conflict between states parties to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949.9 In all other cases, the ICRC gains access to
places of detention only through special agreements concluded with the
state concerned' ° or, in case of internal armed conflicts, with each of the
parties to the conflict;" these agreements may generally be terminated at
any time.
Gautier's proposal was to broaden this system of visits to encompass all
other places where persons are deprived of their liberty such as prisons,
police stations, psychiatric institutions and remand centers. This proposal
subsequently formed the basis of a draft Optional Protocol to the (then)
draft International Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman
6 Id., Art. 2.

'Id., Art. 7, para. 1.

'See also Explanatory Report, id., App. II, paras. 1-11.
9
See common Art. 10/10/10/11, Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135 and 287, respectively. Where both parties to the
conflict are also parties to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention:; of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (openedfor

signatureDec. 12, 1977, ICRC, PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
12 AUGUST 1949, at 3 (1977)) [hereinafter Protocol I], the ICRC's powers will apply in the
context of a war of national liberation regarding which a declaration under Article 96, paragraph 3 of that Protocol has been made. Note also in this connection Article 8 1 of Protocol 1.
10This applies in particular to visits made by the ICRC to political detainees (in peacetime).
See, e.g., Sandoz, La Notion de protection dans le droit internationalhuynanitair, et au sein du
Mouvement de la Croix-Rouge, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS IN HONOUR OFJ. PICTET 985 (1984).
11See common Art. 3, Geneva Conventions, supra note 9. The minimum standards of protection in noninternational armed conflicts set forth in common Article 3 are amplified in
Article 4 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 19,19, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (openedfor signatureDec. 12,
1977, ICRC, supra note 9, at 89) [hereinafter Protocol II], at least with respect to the restricted
category of internal conflicts to which Protocol II applies (see Art. 1). However, a proposal to
reiterate in Article 4 of Protocol II that an impartial humanitarian body such as the ICRC "may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict" (the so-called right of initiative provided for in
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions) was defeated at the 1977 Diplomatic Conference that adopted the Protocol.
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2
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the UN Convention). The draft
was prepared jointly by the Swiss Committee against Torture and the International Commission of Jurists and was submitted in April 1980 by the
Government of Costa Rica for eventual consideration by the Commission on
3
Human Rights, the body called upon to draft the UN Convention.
4
With the fate of the Costa Rican draft extremely uncertain, steps were in
the meantime set in train within the Council of Europe to realize Gautier's
idea, at least at the regional level. The initiative came from the Legal Affairs
Committee of the Council's Consultative Assembly,'" acting on the strength
of the support for Costa Rica's Optional Protocol that had earlier been
expressed by the Assembly itself.' 6 In June 1983, a report was produced on
behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee by its rapporteur, Noel Berrier, with
a draft European Convention on the Protection of Detainees from Torture
and from Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment appended.' 7 The draft had been prepared at Berrier's request by the International Commission of Jurists and the Swiss Committee against Torture and
was closely modeled on their earlier draft Optional Protocol for the UN
Convention. In September 1983, the report was accepted by the Consulta8
tive Assembly, which proceeded to issue a recommendation' that the
Committee of Ministers adopt a convention incorporating the terms of the
Legal Affairs Committee's draft.' 9

"2GA Res. 39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984), draft reprinted in 23 ILM 1027 (1984), substantive changes
noted in 24 ILM 535 (1985).
1' For the text of the draft Optional Protocol, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1409 (1980). See also
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS & SWISS COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, TOR-

TURE: HOW TO MAKE THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION EFFECTIVE

(2d ed. 1980). The

draft was submitted "for use as a basis for consideration by the Commission on Human Rights
when once [sl] the Convention has been adopted." This was done to avoid any further delay in
submitting the already long-debated UN Convention to the Economic and Social Council.
Given its novel approach, the draft Optional Protocol was thought likely to prove controversial.
"' In the event, the UN Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 10, 1984;
it entered into force on June 26, 1987; and the first members of the Committee against
Torture were elected at a meeting of the parties to the UN Convention held in Geneva on Nov.
26, 1987. Costa Rica's draft Optional Protocol has yet to be considered by the Commission on
Human Rights. On Mar. 13, 1986, that Commission deferred consideration of the draft to its
45th session in 1989. At the same time, it recommended that states consider adopting regional
conventions along the same lines as Costa Rica's draft. See H.R. Comm'n Res. 1986/56, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1986/L. I I/Add. 10, at 5.
"s The Consultative Assembly is a consultative organ comprising members of the national
legislatures of each of the 22 member states of the Council of Europe. Its function is to provide
recommendations to the Committee of Ministers, the Council's decision-making organ. The
Committee of Ministers is composed of the Foreign Ministers (or their deputies) of each of the
member states.
"bSee Eur. Consult. Ass., 32d Sess., Recommendation No. 909, especially paras. 7 and 8
(1981).
17See Eur. Consult. Ass., 35th Sess., Doc. No. 5099 (1983). An opinion on the Legal Affairs
Committee's report was also sought from the Assembly's Political Affairs Committee, whose
rapporteur, Claude Dejardin, concluded by endorsing the Legal Affairs Committee's proSee zd., Doc. No. 5123 (1983).
posals.
1
See id., Recommendation No. 971 (1983).
lb On Assembly recommendations, see note 15 supra.
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There followed almost 4 years of debate over the draft Convention within
the subordinate organs of the Committee of Ministers. That committee first
referred the matter to the Steering Committee for Human Rights, 20 which
in turn referred it to the Committee of Experts for the Extension of the
Rights Embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights (Committee of Experts). 2' The labors of the Committee of Experts occupied seven
successive sessions, 22 during which it also sought and considered the views of
the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, the European
Committee for Legal Co-operation and the European Committee on Crime
Problems, 23 and held hearings with representatives of the Swiss Committee
against Torture, the International Commission of Jurists and the ICRC, as
well as two psychiatric experts. An agreed draft of the Convention was
finally conveyed to the Steering Committee for Human Rights in June
1986. Annexed to the report of the Committee of Experts was an Explanatory Report, amplifying upon and explaining the provisions of the Convention itself. In the course of debate on the text of the Convention, numerous
compromises were reached on the basis of agreement to insert particular
clarifications or observations into this Explanatory Report. Accordingly, the
report was seen by the drafting bodies as having great importance for the
eventual interpretation of the Convention, and almost as having a kind of
"binding force" of its own.2"
Following further consideration by the Steering Committee at two meetings in late 1986, the draft Convention and Explanatory Report were transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which ultimately adopted it on June
26, 1987, after final consultation with the Consultative Assembly.25 Opened
for signature on November 26, 1987, the Convention has been signed by all
20

The Steering Committee for Human Rights is a body of government experts on human
rights from member states of the Council of Europe, responsible directly to the Committee of
Ministers. The relevant terms of reference were conferred on it at the 366th meeting of the
Ministers' Deputies, in January 1984.
21The Committee of Experts is a body of government experts from member states of the
Council of Europe, specifically concerned with measures to achieve the fullest possible implementation of the ECHR. The committee is responsible to the Steering Commit tee. The relevant terms of reference were conferred on it by the latter committee at its 15th meeting, in
March 1984.
The subject was seen as falling within the expertise of the Committee of Experts because the
Convention was perceived as an elaboration or specification of the provisions of Article 3 of the
ECHR: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." However, as will be indicated later, the precise relation between the Convention
and Article 3 proved in the end to be one of the major points of controversy.
22 The Convention was debated at its 19th to 25th meetings (May 1984-June 1986), under
the chairmanship initially of the Swiss expert Krafft, and later of the Norwegian expert Mose.
As these meetings are confidential, no minutes exist.
25 These are two other subordinate bodies responsible to the Committee of Ministers.
24 In one of its reports, the Steering Committee for Human Rights drew the attention of the
Committee of Ministers to the "great importance which should be attached to the explanatory
report in relation to the interpretation of the Convention by the Parties and the new Committee."
" See Eur. Consult. Ass., 39th Sess., Opinion No. 133 (1987) (on draft European Convention
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
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of the then 21 member states of the Council of Europe.26 As of the date of
writing, it has been ratified by the requisite seven states 2 7 and consequently
will enter into force on February 1, 1989.
Utility Questioned
An early question faced by the various committees charged with elaborating the Convention was whether any international instrument of the kind
envisaged was needed at all. This question soon resolved itself into two.
First, was such a Convention needed in Western Europe where the rate of
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is relatively
low? There can be little doubt that it was. According to various respectable
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (including Amnesty International
and the International Commission of Jurists), inhuman and degrading
treatment, as well as, in some isolated cases, torture itself, has been practiced
in several member states of the Council of Europe, particularly in relation to
persons held on suspicion of terrorist or other politically motivated offenses. 8 Even with respect to states not then known to be engaging in
human rights violations of this type, the Convention would serve a useful
purpose because they, too, were at risk. Torture and inhuman and degrading treatment are social diseases whose only permanent cure is the complete
eradication of the conditions that give rise to them, an important, but
long-term, goal indeed. In the meantime, no state can remain complacent or
count itself immune.
A further rationale for the Convention was that it could serve as a prototype for testing the validity and practicality of the system at the regional
level before it came to be implemented at the more difficult universal level
pursuant to Costa Rica's draft Optional Protocol. This was the answer to
those who expressed concern that the Convention might slow down or even
jeopardize Costa Rica's efforts within the United Nations. There wereand remain-grounds for treating this as a matter better regulated, or at
least more easily regulated, at the regional level than at the world level.
Thus, if successful, it was hoped that the Convention could also serve as a
model for similar conventions in other regions.2 9 The committees and
NGOs involved in the elaboration of the Convention were acutely conscious
of this pioneering human rights mission of the Council of Europe, a mission
that had begun in 1950 with the adoption of the European Convention for
.2 It was signed by all member states except Turkey and Ireland on Nov. 26, 1987. Turkey
signed it onJan. 11, 1988, and Ireland on Mar. 14, 1988.
2
7 Turkey, Ireland, Malta, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Switzerland.
The Convention has subsequently been ratified by the Netherlands.
" The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and Turkey were
the main targets of NGO criticism. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE (1973); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES (1984). See also C.
HUMANA, THE ECONOMIST WORLD HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE (1986).

2' Efforts to supplement the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
(Dec. 9. 1985, reprinted in 25 ILM 519 (1986)) with a mechanism for preventive visits are
currently in progress. Similar work may also be expected in relation to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights of June 1981 (OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 ILM 59 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986)).
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the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Accordingly,
great importance was attached to setting a valuable precedent and the Convention should therefore be read with an eye to its application outside the
member states of the Council of Europe.
The second question raised about the utility of the Convention was:
would the Convention simply duplicate activities undertaken pursuant to
other conventions or arrangements? Four possibilities were mentioned: the
,activities of national authorities in pursuance of the Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners drawn up under the aegis of the
United Nations and the penal rules established by the Council of Europe,"0
as implemented in national legislation; the activities of the ICRC; the func-

tions of the organs of the ECHR, the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights (the Commission and Court, respectively); and, finally, the
activities undertaken under the umbrella of the United Nations, both
by the Committee
against Torture 3' and by the UN Special Rapporteur
32
on Torture.

First, as regards national measures undertaken on the basis of' the various
sets of rules concerning the treatment of prisoners, experience has shown
that these have not provided a sufficient guarantee against torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment in European institutions. When left entirely in the hands of national authorities, human rights standards appear to
be all too easily overborne by "conflicting" considerations.
Second, so far as the ICRC is concerned, it was plain from the outset that
the Convention was intended to supplement, rather than duplicate, its
work.13 However, to the extent that the ICRC's efforts, particularly in

relation to political detainees, may be restricted or hampered or in any other
way not totally adequate, there seems to be no reason in principle that the
" The UN rules were adopted by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Aug. 30, 1955, and then approved by ESC Res, 663C (XXIV) (July
31, 1957). They were later amended by ESC Res. 2076 (LXII) (May 1, 1977). 11Fhe Council of
Europe's European penal rules were recommended by the Committee of Ministers on Feb. 12,
1987, Recommendation No. R (87) 3. See also Draft Body of Principles for the Protection of all
Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Sub-Comm'n on Prewention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Res. 5C (Sept. 13, 1973); Declaration on the Police,
Appendix, Eur. Consult. Ass., 31st Sess., Res. 690 (May 8, 1979); Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials, GA Res. 34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979); Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant
to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and
Detainees against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
GA Res. 37/194 (Dec. 18, 1982). See further, in relation to the treatment of involuntary
psychiatric patients in European institutions, Recommendation No. R (85) 3 of Ihe Council of
Europe's Committee of Ministers, on the legal duties of doctors.
" See note 14 supra.
"2 The Special Rapporteur on Torture was established pursuant to Comm'n on Human
Rights Res. 1985/33 of Mar. 13, 1985, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/SR.55, paras. 50, 62. This
resolution was ratified on May 30, 1985, by the ECOSOC by Decision 1985/144, 1985 UN
ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 44, UN Doc. E/1985/85. For an account of the background to this
resolution and a description of the rapporteur's functions, see N. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT
OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 120-25 (1987).
Is On the work of the ICRC, see generally the Annual Reports of the ICRC. As to its practice
in relation to noninternational conflicts, seeJ. MOREILLON, LE COMITk INTERNATIONAL DE
LA CROIX-ROUGE ET LA PROTEcTION DES DkTENUS POLITIQUES (1973); Veuthey, inplementa-
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new Committee should not intervene. Thus, the Convention provides that
the Committee is not to visit places "effectively" visited "on a regular basis"
by the ICRC by virtue of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols
thereto.34 Peacetime visits by the ICRC, falling entirely outside the ambit of
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, accordingly remain unaffected by this provision. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the
new Committee will establish liaison with the ICRC and will not seek to
duplicate effective, regular visiting arrangements the ICRC already has in
place in time of peace.
The third area of possible overlap-the competence of the Commission
and of the Court pursuant to the ECHR-was the one of greatest concern.
It was feared that the efficacy of the ECHR protection machinery would be
diluted through the concurrent activities of an autonomous third body. In
particular, the new Committee might adopt an interpretation of Article 3 of
the ECHR"5 that conflicted with the Court's jurisprudence on the matter,
undermining the authority of the Court and creating undesirable confusion.
In addition, a person whose case had been examined by the Committee
might actually be left in a worse position, in that he or she could be barred
from lodging a petition with the Commission under the ECHR, 6 on a basis
similar to resjudicata.37 Finally, attention was drawn to the fact that provision for on-the-spot fact-finding visits and for action of a preventive
nature
38
was already made in the Commission's Rules of Procedure.
To allay these fears, the Convention explicitly provides that it is not to be
construed as limiting or derogating from the competence of the ECHR
organs.3" The Explanatory Report adds that the Committee is to respect the
established competence of the Commission and the Court and is not to
intervene in proceedings pending before them or formulate interpretations
of the ECHR, particularly Article 3.40 The report also states that the right of
individual petition remains unaffected.4
tion and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Lau' in Non-International Armed
Conflicts: The Role of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 83 (1983); T.
MERON, HUMAN

RIGHTS IN

INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

105-17 (1987).
See Convention, Art. 17, para. 3; and Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 93.
55
See note 21 supra.
36 See note 3 supra.
s7 ECHR Art. 27, para. 1 provides: "The Commission shall not deal with any petition
submitted under Article 25 which . . . (b) is substantially the same as a matter which has
already been examined by the Commission or has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and if it contains no relevant new information."
" European Comm'n of Human Rights, Rules of Procedure (rev. text brought up-to-date on
May 15, 1983), 1983 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs., ch. II, at 7. Concerning on-the-spot
fact-finding visits, see id., Rule 14, para. 2, and Rule 28, para. 2. See also ECHR Art. 28(a).
Concerning preventive measures, see Rules of Procedure, supra, Rule 28, para. 1, and Rule 36.
3q Convention, Art. 17, para. 2.
40 Explanatory Report, supra note 8, paras. 17, 27 and 91. Although the Committee will not
intervene in proceedings brought under the ECHR, there have been suggestions that it may
assist individual petitioners of whose circumstances it has become aware, particularly in relation
to the exhaustion of local remedies.
41 Id., para. 92.
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However, even absent these provisions, the Committee's work will not
interfere with that of the Commission and the Court, which are charged
with enforcing legal rules and redressing legal wrongs. The Committee will
be concerned only with fact-finding investigations carried out in a humanitarian and practical manner and leading only to nonbinding recommendations. Its aim will be to enlist the cooperation of national authorities in
protecting persons deprived of their liberty, rather than to make legal assessments of those authorities' conduct or accuse them of violations of the
relevant rules.
In consequence, there is little reason to expect any adverse effect on the
activities of the Commission and the Court. On the contrary, the new Committee can only supplement the valuable-but complex, hence unfortunately slow-procedures of these bodies, which in any case come into play
ex post facto, indeed not until all domestic remedies have been exhausted.
Even though the Commission's rules provide for fact-finding visits, they can
only be undertaken when an application before the Commission under the
ECHR has been declared admissible.4 2 Preventive measures can be indicated prior to the Commission's decision on admissibility, but still only in the
context of a particular application. Thus, unlike the new Committee, the
Commission has no jurisdiction to investigate the human rights situation in
the territory of a state party otherwise than in connection with pending
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
Similar considerations apply to the fourth suggested area of duplication,
the activities of the UN Committee against Torture.4 3 Its functions are
essentially to monitor compliance with,4 4 and deal with complaints of
breaches of,4 5 the UN Convention. It may also undertake visits4 but only
once it is in possession of "well-founded indications that torture is being
systematically practised in the territory of a State Party" and, significantly,

42 For an account of the fact-finding powers of the Commission and of the very few occasions

on which they have been used, see Ramcharan, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1, 19-20 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1982); and

Kruiger, The Experience of the European Commission of Human Rights, in id. at 151, 151-59.
s Several Council of Europe member states are parties to the UN Convention and hence are
potentially subject to the competence of the Committee against Torture. As of Oct. 31, 1987,
Sweden, France, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg and Spain had ratified
the Convention, each at the same time making a declaration under Articles 21 and 22 that it
accepted the competence of the Committee to receive and consider "communications" from
states and individuals concerning violations of the Convention. In addition, none of them made
the reservation envisaged by Article 28 whereby a state can exclude the competence of the
Committee to undertake, propriomotu, investigations, including fact-finding visits, under Arti-

cle

20. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, STATUS

AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1987, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/6, at 174-77 (1988); and UN Doc.
A/43/519 (1988).
4 UN Convention, supra note 12, Art. 19.
4 A specific declaration recognizing the UN Committee's competence in this regard is
required. See id., Arts. 21 and 22; and note 43 supra.
4 UN Convention, supra note 12, Art. 20. A specific right of reservation is conferred in
respect of this provision, id., Art. 28; see also note 43 supra.
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only "in agreement with that State Party." Such visits will probably be
relatively infrequent, as compared to the regular and occasionally ad hoc,
but always compulsory, visits of the new Committee.
The mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture4 7 is to "examine
questions relevant to torture" and report on "the occurrence and extent of
its practice." 48 These provisions certainly do not seem to exclude his making
visits to places where persons are deprived of their liberty but, again, any
such visits would require the specific consent of the state concerned 49 and
clearly could not be undertaken on any regular basis.
Admittedly, each of the four categories of organs and authorities mentioned does operate in the same sphere as the new Committee, even if their
respective functions and orientation are different. The Convention itself
implicitly recognizes this by stating that it shall not prejudice the provisions
of any domestic law or international agreement which provide greater protection to persons deprived of their liberty."0 Thus, the new Committee will
contribute one means among many of combating ill-treatment of detainees.
Any precise appreciation of its relation to existing bodies, that is, of its
proper niche, will, of course, need to await the Committee's actual practice.

Legal Basis
Just as the Committee does not operate entirely in a "practical" vacuum,
there was concern to ensure that it should also not operate in a legal vacuum. Since the Convention was designed to provide a new mechanism for
securing respect for human rights of a particular kind but not to set new
standards as regards those rights, some foundation for the activities of the
Committee under preexisting legal standards needed to be provided.
From the outset, it was clear that the relevant legal standard was the
prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
contained in a variety of legal instruments, including, for the purposes of
"European" law, Article 3 of the ECHR.5 1 As a result, Article 1 of the

4'As the special rapporteur is appointed by resolution of the UN Commission on Human

Rights (see note 32 supra) rather than by agreement, his competence extends to all UN member
states, and hence to all member states of the Council of Europe with the exception of Switzerland.
4 See Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 1985/33, supra note 32, paras. 1 and 7.
The special rapporteur's first report makes no mention of any visits having been undertaken. See UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15.
50 Convention, Art. 17, para. I. Correlative provisions are made in the ECHR (Art. 60) and
the UN Convention, supra note 12 (Art. 1, para. 2, Art. 14, para. 2, and Art. 16, para. 2).
"' See note 21 supra. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A, UN
Doc. A/8 10, at 71 (1948), Art. 5; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA
Res. 2200, supra note 3, Supp. (No. 16) at 52, Art. 7; American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 3, Art. 5, para. 2; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 29,
Art. 5; as well as the specific instruments concerning torture mentioned in notes 14 and 29
supra.
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original draft of the Convention,52 began: "In order better to ensure respect
for and observe Article 3 of the [ECHR]."
However, precisely how Article 3 was to be referred to in the final version
was a delicate question; although it was to be the standard justifying and
underlying the Committee's activities, the Committee was not actually going
to "apply" it. As already noted, the Commission and the Court have exclusive jurisdiction to apply Article 3 in the sense of construing it and then
measuring existing circumstances against it. By contrast, the Committee's
charge was to apprise itself of a broad range of circumstances among which
would undoubtedly be some that did not fall afoul of Article 3 but which, if
allowed to continue or develop, might do so. On the basis of this factual
appraisal, it was to make recommendations for alleviating the latter type of
circumstances.
Thus, there was resistance to the sort of reference to Article 3 that had
been included in the original draft, as it seemed to imply that the Committee
would be involved in the "application," or even enforcement, of the article.
The solution eventually adopted was a symbolic one: reference to Article 3
was deleted from the text of the Convention and moved instead to its
Preamble and to the Explanatory Report.53 The latter explains that Article
3 is to provide the Committee with a "point of reference," the case law of
the Court and the Commission 54 on the article providing it also with a
"source of guidance.""5 In practice, however, fine definitional distinctions
concerning the provisions of Article 3 are not likely to be of much concern
to the Committee, given the preventive nature-hence relatively wide
compass-of its activities. On the other hand, the reference to Article 3
does not rule out the possibility of recourse by the Committee beth to other
international instruments dealing with torture (e.g., the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 56 the 1984 UN Convention on

Torture 57 and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights"6 ) and to
5

The draft appended to Recommendation 971, supra note 18, will be referred to as the
"original draft."
" Explanatory Report, supra note 8, paras. 22, 26 and 27.
54 For a summary of the voluminous case law on Article 3, together with rererences to the
relevant cases, see 1 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DIGEST OF STRASBOURG CASE-LAW RELATING TO
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 89-235 (1984) [hereinafter STRASBOURG
CASE-LAW]. For academic commentary on the subject, see Doswald-Beck, What does the Prohibition of "Torture or Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment" mean? The interpretation of the
European Commission and CourtofHuman Rights, 25 NETH. INT'L L.R. 24 (1978); Duffy, Article 3
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 32 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 316 (1933); Sudre, La
Notion de "peines et traitementsinhumains ou digradants"dons la jurisprudencede la Commission et de
la Cour europiennes des droits de l'homme, 88 REVUE GNRtALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 825 (1984).
5s The Convention facilitates reference to the jurisprudence on Article 3 by exactly reproducing the formula used in Article 3 ("torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment"). By contrast, the original draft employed the formula used in the UN Convention and elsewhere, which incorporates "cruel" treatment or punishment as well, though it is
doubtful that this actually reflects any substantive difference.
" See note 51 supra.
See note 12 supra.
5
8See note 3 supra.
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the "case law" developed by the relevant international bodies under those
instruments (e.g., the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee
against Torture and the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human
Rights). Reliance on this outside "legislation" and practice might prove of
some help in a few difficult areas, such as that covered by the concept of
"inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the Committee will not need to delve into sophisticated legal considerations, it might
find it useful in some cases to draw inspiration from what has been said or
done in related international forums.
Visits
A greater practical concern for the Committee will be the legal parameters that circumscribe its right to make visits. On what basis may the Committee decide upon a visit? What places can it visit? Must it give notification
and, if so, when? On what grounds, if any, may it be excluded from, or
restricted in, carrying out visits? How extensive are its powers of investigation? I shall consider each of these five questions in turn.
In deciding to carry out an ad hoc visit, the Committee is entitled to act on
information received from any source (including individual communications,
allegations from NGOs and press reports). On the other hand, the Committee is not obliged to act on information it receives. 59
Especially in relation to periodic visits, the Committee is also clearly dependent on receiving information as to the existence of places of detention
in the various contracting states. In addition to the information it may
receive from individuals and private organizations, the Committee obviously requires assistance in this respect from the states themselves. On its
request, the latter are bound to provide a list of places under their jurisdiction where persons deprived of their liberty are being held and to indicate
the nature of each establishment (e.g., police station, prison, hospital, military barracks, mental health institution).6" In planning its periodic visits, the
Committee is at liberty to decide which institutions in a particular state it
wishes to visit, since it will generally not be practicable for it to see, on every
visit, all the places in the state that fall within the ambit of Article 2. Thus,
the Committee is accorded a useful margin of discretion in relation to its
visits. The only requirement is that periodic visits be made to states parties
on a roughly "equitable" basis. 6'
As for the second of the five questions posed, Article 2 of the Convention
provides that the Committee may visit any place within the jurisdiction of
states parties "where persons are deprived of their liberty by a public authority." Some elaboration of this provision is given in the Explanatory
Report: as few as one person need be detained in the place to be visited; no
formal decision of the public authority need have been made (hence, de
facto detention is also covered by the Convention); civilian and military,
s See Convention, Art. 7, para. 1; and Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 49.
o See Convention, Art. 8, para. 2(b); and Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 62.
See Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 48.
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penal and "medical," and administrative and "educational" detentions of
all kinds are included; and public and private institutions are equally covered, provided the deprivation of liberty is the result of action by a public
authority.62 Deprivation of liberty in private institutions with which a public
authority has nothing whatever to do is thus excluded, as is voluntary confinement.
On its face, the Convention therefore seems not to cover, among other
things, the "voluntary" committal of a person to a psychiatric hospital carried out at the request of the family, without the intervention of a public
authority and without the consent of the person concerned, which is permitted under the legislation of a number of European countries. Yet it
stands to reason that the commitment of healthy persons to a mental hospital can amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. Accordingly, the Explanatory Report stresses that, in the case of "voluntary" patients, the
Committee is authorized "to satisfy itself that [the confinement] was indeed
the wish of the patient concerned." 6 3 Alternatively, if the patient is unable
to "express his wish," the Committee also seems to have the power to
investigate whether the committal was warranted by his medical condition
and does not amount to inhuman treatment.
A further question arises: who has the final say as to whether a particular
place falls within the ambit of Article 2? This question has both a factual and
a legal dimension: must the Committee accept a state's assertion as to the
factual circumstances obtaining in a particular place or can it act on its own
information about the circumstances there? The issue will doubtless be
resolved within the framework of Article 3: "In the application of the
Convention, the Committee and the competent national authorities of the
Party concerned shall co-operate with each other." Cooperation in regard
to the Committee's right to visit appears to mean that an exaggeratedly
strict application of Article 2, which moreover denies the Committee the
possibility of verifying a party's assertions, is inappropriate. Thus, it could
well be argued that in doubtful cases the Committee should be permitted to
make whatever visits it chooses, especially as a mechanism for postponing
visits to a "sensitive" place or person is available to parties with valid objections to them.64

Let us now consider the third question: what is meant by "deprivation of
liberty"? The Explanatory Report states that this notion is to be "understood
within the meaning of Article 5 of the [ECHR], as elucidated by the case law
of the . .. Court and. . . Commission." 6 5 Article 5, paragraph 1 of the
ECHR sets forth the basic proposition that "everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person." It then lists six situations in which the deprivation
of a person's liberty will exceptionally be lawful when carried ou: in accord62

6
Id., paras. 28-32.
Id., para. 32.
6 See Convention, Art. 9 (and text at note 70 infra).
65
See Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 24. For a summary of the ca,,.e law on this

aspect of Article 5, together with references to the relevant cases, see 1 STRASBOURG CASELAW, supra note 54, at 271-306; and M.-A. EISSEN, CASE-LAW ON ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (1986).

19891

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

ance with a procedure prescribed by law. Most of the relevant case law
involves these six exceptions. Thus, there was serious concern that the
reference to the Article 5 case law might give the misleading impression that
this distinction between lawful and unlawful deprivations of liberty was
somehow relevant to the Convention or, worse still, might suggest that the
Convention should only apply in relation to places where persons were
"lawfully" deprived of their liberty. To overcome these concerns, the Explanatory Report, in its final draft, states that the distinction between lawful
and unlawful deprivations of liberty arising in connection with Article 5 is
immaterial as regards the Committee's competence. 66
Notification of visits by the Committee is provided for in Article 8.67 The
Committee is required to notify the government concerned of its "intention
to carry out a visit" and may then visit "at any time" any place in the
relevant state's jurisdiction that falls within the ambit of Article 2. The
national authorities are required to provide the Committee with the facilities needed to carry out its tasks, including full information on places where
persons deprived of their liberty are held, free access to all such places and
private interviews with persons held there, and such other information as
68
the Committee might require.
Underlying Article 8 is a tension between two conflicting objectives. On
the one hand, it is obviously desirable for the Committee's visits to be
unannounced, so that national authorities cannot engage in anticipatory
cover-ups. To be effective, the Committee must form a true picture of the
conditions in the places it visits. On the other hand, some prior notification
is needed to enable national authorities to provide the necessary facilities to
the Committee and to make its visits effective. A prison is unlikely to open its
doors to the Committee without some advance notice of its arrival; a prison
governor may not be available to speak to the Committee if he does not
know when it will be visiting. Special arrangements will also be needed for
visits to high-security prisons and certain psychiatric institutions.
The issue was resolved by not specifying any particular periods of notice
to be given (3 months, 6 months, 24 hours and 48 hours were among those
suggested) and, instead, leaving notification flexible. When an urgent ad
hoc visit is called for, notice may presumably be as short as a few hours. On
the other hand, a periodic visit or an ad hoc visit that is not urgent may be
proposed and notification given without specifying the date and place of
arrival of Committee members. In this situation, the Committee may be
expected, in keeping with the principle of cooperation laid down in Article
3, to give the states concerned sufficient further notice to enable them to
make the arrangements necessary to ensuring the effectiveness of the visit.
See Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 24.
67 See also id., paras. 55-59.
" See Convention, Art. 8, para. 2; and Explanatory Report, supra note 8, paras. 60-65. To
meet concerns regarding the data protection implications of this provision, it is specifically
stated that parties are to have regard to relevant national laws and professional (particularly
medical) ethics. Convention, Art. 8, para. 2(d).
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The fourth aspect of its right to visit that will be of vital importance to the
Committee is the groundsfor restrictingvisits. The original draft of the Convention contained no provision for parties to prevent, or secure the postponement of, a visit to which they objected. This was a particularly significant omission because, at the same time, the draft precluded re:;ervations to
the Convention. The bar on reservations was retained in the final version,6 9
but a new provision allowing for the postponement of visits on certain
grounds was included. What led to this change?
In the drafting process, two major problems were raised in this respect.
First, it was pointed out that if persons are being detained in mnilitary installations (particularly nuclear plants), compelling considerations of national
security may prompt a state to regard a visit by the Committee as inappropriate (e.g., fear that defense secrets may be revealed to the Committee).
Second, attention was drawn to the case of detaineespresentinga high security
risk, in particular, those held because of acts of terrorism or espionage; their
place of detention might have to be kept secret. Further, circumstances may
arise that warrant at least a temporary postponement of visits by the Committee: epidemics in the area to be visited, outbreaks of serious disorder
where detainees are being held and similar situations in which the health or
personal safety of members of the Committee would be at risk.
While these considerations seemed relevant and important, a number of
draftsmen stressed that they should not prevent the Committee from fulfilling its task. If a contracting state were given the right to rely upon one of
those grounds to avoid being visited, this right might easily lend itself to
abuse and thwart the Committee's function.
A balance between these two opposing needs was struck in Article 9.7" It
provides that in exceptional circumstances a party may make representations to the Committee against a visit at the time or to the particular place
proposed, on the grounds only of "national defence, public safety, serious
disorder in places where persons are deprived of their liberty, the medical
condition of a person or that an urgent interrogation relating to a serious
crime is in progress." Following the representations, the party and the
Committee "shall immediately enter into consultations in order to clarify
the situation and seek agreement on arrangements to enable the Committee
to exercise its functions expeditiously." In the meantime, the Commission is
to be kept fully informed about the persons deprived of their liberty in the
place concerned.
Plainly, this provision, although it makes allowance for the compelling
needs of the contracting states, does not grant states the power to impede a
visit of the Committee altogether, or to remove particular places from its
supervisory authority. First, it specifically provides that there must be "exceptional circumstances." Second, while some grounds are couched in very
loose terms ("national defence," "public safety") and consequently confer
some leeway on states in their interpretation and application, other grounds
6 Convention, Art. 21.
7See also Explanatory Report, supra note 8, paras. 71-72.
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lend themselves to a less subjective appraisal and will not be difficult for the
Committee to evaluate ("serious disorder" in places of detention, "the medical condition" of detainees, the fact that "an urgent interrogation relating
to a serious crime is in progress"). Third, the state concerned and the
Committee are duty bound to reach a mutually acceptable settlement for
postponing the visit or for carrying it out in accordance with special arrangements.7 1 Fourth, the state concerned is obliged to keep the Committee informed about any person concerned "until the visit takes place." Finally, the
Committee is provided with a "sanction" in case the state is uncooperative:
it can make a "public statement on the matter. -72
There will clearly be occasions when state concerns will constitute entirely
proper grounds for seeking the postponement of a visit or for making
alternative arrangements for one. On the other hand, it should not be
possible to postpone visits for too long or even indefinitely, with the result
that the Committee would be effectively prevented from carrying out visits
in situations where they are often most needed. (Experience has shown that
most torture occurs during interrogations and is inflicted on political suspects and those in "secret" military or quasi-military establishments.) In this
way, the parties' obligations could easily be rendered illusory.
Article 9, then, was a compromise that seeks to meet the concerns referred to above, without providing an actual escape clause. The article must
be read in the light of other provisions of the Convention: Articles 2, 8, 10
and, especially, 3. The latter, which states the obligation of the parties and
the Committee to cooperate with one another, was seen as the linchpin of
Article 9. Thus, Article 9 permits parties to propose the postponement
of a visit on the basis of their willingness to cooperate with the Committee
in reaching agreement on alternative arrangements so that the visit
can be carried out as soon as possible. At the same time, it is implicitly
incumbent on the Committee to cooperate with the parties in maintaining
an appropriate degree of sensitivity to any valid practical or other objections to a proposed visit and in finding acceptable means of overcoming
those objections.
One could perhaps envisage the danger that Article 9 may weaken the
Convention, at least where good faith in its application is lacking. Although
the article does not allow a visit to be postponed indefinitely, it does provide
a mechanism by which a visit may be delayed on vague, and perhaps easily
7'These arrangements might include, in the case of military installations, confining the
Committee's visit solely to the place where persons deprived of their liberty are being detained.
In addition, the Committee might be accompanied on its visit by an official of the state

concerned (who, however, should not be allowed to be present at the interview of detainees). In
the case of high-security prisons, to keep from revealing the whereabouts of detainees presenting a high-security risk, the state concerned might be required to supply the Committee with
two different lists, one of places of detention and one of persons deprived of their liberty.
Should the Committee wish to interview a particular person, the interview might be held in a
place other than the place of detention (however, this procedure should be exceptional, for it is
generally important for the Committee to visit the place where a detainee is actually held, to get
an idea of how he is being treated).
"2 See Convention, Art. 10, para. 2.
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manufacturable, grounds. A government intent on practicing torture and
"getting away with it" might find this advantageous, since even a short delay
may be sufficient for the physical signs of ill-treatment--frequently the
victim's only corroborative evidence-to disappear. The most subjective
grounds mentioned above-those relating to "national defence" and
"public safety"-might be cause for particular concern in this regard.
Much will depend on whether, in the event, the Committee is successful in

fostering a spirit of cooperation in relation to the Convention. If it is, parties
will come to trust the Committee and rely on its discretion. For the Committee's part, it will clearly have no interest in facilitating escapes by prisoners or in learning military secrets. Its sole interest will be in examining,
and, if necessary, securing improvements in, the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty; in this endeavor, it can only profit from a cooperative, understanding attitude.

Let us now turn to our fifth question, the powers of investigation of the
Committee. This body, by its very nature (not being a judicial organ, as
noted above), cannot conduct formal hearings similar to those of a court of
law. In particular, it cannot oblige persons to give evidence under oath or to
produce documents. Indeed, it cannot oblige persons to communicate with
it at all. Of course, under Article 3, representatives of national authorities
-including staff members of places of detention such as prison officers,
employees of mental hospitals and the police-have a duty to cooperate
with the Committee and therefore cannot, in practice, refuse to communicate with it. By contrast, detainees themselves, as well as their families,
lawyers, doctors, nurses, and the like (those unconnected with their place of
detention), may be interviewed by the Committee in private, but only if they
agree."m Anticipating the possibility that a person deprived of his liberty may
refuse to communicate with the Committee following pressure from his
national authorities, the Explanatory Report stresses that the Committee
must be given an opportunity to satisfy itself that the decision not to communicate was in fact freely made. 4
A further illustration of its broad powers of investigation is the fact that
the Committee is not limited to visiting the places of detention specified in
its original notification. If it appears, during the course of a visit to one
establishment, that important evidence as to the treatment of certain detainees may be found in another establishment in the same state, the Committee is free to visit that second establishment notwithstanding its omission
75
from the Committee's original notification.
Finally, it should be recalled that the Committee's mandate is couched in
relatively wide terms; the thrust of its activities is generally to strengthen the
protection of detainees from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. Thus, its investigations will be concerned not only with
adverse treatment by the authorities themselves, but also with ill-treatment
" See id., Art. 8; and Explanatory Report, supra note 8, paras. 66-69.

" See Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 67.
"See Convention, Art. 8; and Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 58.
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of detainees by their fellow detainees. In relation to the latter, the Committee will no doubt consider what measures could be taken by the relevant
authorities to prevent, or at least minimize, such abuses.
The Conmittee
In setting up the Committee, the Convention largely follows the model of
the ECHR for the establishment of the Commission. It provides, first, that
the number of members of the Committee is to equal that of the parties,76
with no two members being nationals of the same state. However,
members are to serve in their individual capacity. 78 Obviously, the Committee's activities should be as apolitical and impartial as possible. There was
some debate as to whether the qualifications of members should be spelled
out; ultimately, only general indications-high moral character, competence in human rights, professional experience in the areas covered by the
Convention-were given. 79 Although the members will not have to be lawyers, at least some of them will need practical experience in fields such as
prison administration, and perhaps even the care of psychiatric patients, so
as to enable the Committee to make useful recommendations to national
authorities. An appropriate blending of professionals and persons with experience in the legal field of human rights will no doubt be required if the
Committee's members are to carry out in-depth investigations and, in addition, negotiate on a high level with national authorities.
The Convention provides that the members of the Committee are to be
elected by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe from
among candidates proposed by the Bureau of the Council's Consultative
Assembly.8" This mode of election is modeled on that stipulated in the
ECH R for the election of members of the European Commission on Human
Rights. The ECHR, however, provides for a different system for members
of the Court: they are elected by the Consultative Assembly from a list of
persons nominated by member states of the Council of Europe. Thus, in the
case of the Court, the last word lies with a representative body, while in the
case of the Commission, a political body (the Committee of Ministers) makes
the final decision. The Consultative Assembly had proposed in its original
draft of the Convention on Torture that the system for electing members of
the Court be adopted as well for the new Committee. However, considerations relating to sovereignty prevailed in the end over demands more
geared to respect for human rights.8"
76 Convention, Art. 4, para. 1. The corresponding provision of the ECHR is Article 20.
77 Convention, Art. 4. para. 3. The corresponding provision of the ECHR is Article 20.
76 Convention, Art. 4, para. 4. The corresponding provision of the ECHR is Article 23.

7" Convention, Art. 4, para. 2. See also Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 2.
" Convention, Art. 5, para. 1. The corresponding provision of the ECHR is Article 21,
paragraph I.
" It should be emphasized, however, that other considerations were adduced to support the
system eventually adopted. At one stage of the drafting process, it was envisaged that states
should be allowed to refuse entry to a member of the Committee. It was then argued that states
parties to the Convention would be less likely to reject a particular member of the new
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In contrast to members of the European Commission on Human Rights,
Committee members are elected for a period of 4 years and may be reelected only once."2 Considering the difficult and delicate nature of the
Committee's activities, one may wonder why the term of its members was
not made longer so they could profit from the experience gained in factfinding techniques. The reason behind the brevity of these terms of office
can be found in the "legislative history" of the Convention.
The original draft prepared by the Consultative Assembly did not provide
that the Committee would consist of as many members as there were parties
to the Convention; it set the number at only five."3 Subsequently, in the
course of hammering out a final draft, it was proposed in the Committee of
Experts that the membership be brought to 7 to ensure balanced geographical distribution (with the Convention entering into force upon ratification
by 7 states); it was later proposed that the number be increased to 11 after
ratification by 15 states. Thus, in spite of this change in figure:3, the draftsmen still held to the idea that there should be no correlation between the
number of ratifying countries and the number of members of the Committee. This, however, prompted some members of the Committee of Experts
to point out that it was only fair to ensure some rotation in membership so as
to allow all contracting states the opportunity to have a national serve on the
Committee. Accordingly, it was proposed that the terms of office be relatively short and that members not be allowed to sit on the Committee for
more than a total of 8 years. Subsequently, concern for state sovereignty
came to prevail, with the consequence, among other things, that each contracting state was permitted to have a national (or a person linked to it) on
the Committee, making the total number of members equal to that of the
parties. After making this important change, however, the draftsmen neglected to change the rules on duration of membership and we are now left
with a somewhat contradictory, or at any rate unsatisfactory, legal regime of
membership.
Decisions of the Committee are to be taken by a simple majority of the
members present, 4 subject to one exception to which I shall refer later. The

Committee if it was elected by the Committee of Ministers rather than by tle Consultative
Assembly (the idea being that states would be estopped from objecting to a part.cular Committee member after his election by such an authoritative political body, on which all member

states of the Council of Europe sit). Accordingly, election by the Committee of Ministers was to
be preferred to election by the Consultative Assembly.
Another reason supporting the system at issue was the fact that the Committee of Ministers
would be in a better position than the Consultative Assembly to ensure both that there was a
geographical balance within the Committee and that all members had the requisite qualifications.
2 Convention, Art. 5, para. 3; cf.ECHR, supra note 3, Art. 22. The original draft (see note
52 supra) followed the model of ECHR Article 22, providing for a 6-year term, indefinitely
renewable (Art. 5, para. 2).
Original draft, supra note 52, Art. 4.
s Convention, Art. 6, para. 1.By contrast, ECHR Article 34 provides that the Commission is
to take its decisions by a majority of the members present and voting. The original draft of the
Convention, supra note 52, followed this model (Art. 6).
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Committee is to draw up its own rules of procedure to deal with such
matters as the election of a chairman, arrangements for meetings, the or85
ganization of visits and the storage of information.
An early question that arose in connection with the Committee was precisely who would carry out the visits contemplated in the Convention. The
original draft provided that the visits would be carried out by "delegates
chosen from among its members or other persons."8 6 It was envisaged that
these delegates would be experts, with experience particularly in visiting
places of detention, assessing levels of respect for human rights and administering prisons. The "other persons" to be chosen as delegates were
thought likely to be individuals with some past experience in the ICRC or
other NGOs, such as Amnesty International, or other professionals in
prison and psychiatric administration.
During the hearings before the drafting bodies, the International Commission of Jurists, the ICRC and the Swiss Committee against Torture
argued strongly that the visits should be carried out by experts, not by
members of the Committee. They reasoned that visits are time-consuming,
call for a great deal of personal availability and demand much practical
experience in the field of prisons and similar institutions. They therefore
suggested that outside experts be engaged to carry out all visits, after receiving advanced special training similar to that of the ICRC's delegates.
The experts would visit places of detention, establish facts and report them
to the Committee; this body would then be responsible for contacts with the
national authorities and for drawing up the final report.
As in other cases, however, considerations of state sovereignty came to
the fore here. States felt more comfortable with the idea of a Committee
that would have the necessary expertise to perform the bulk of its functions
itself. They perceived, in other words, that their national interests would be
less threatened by opening up their places of detention to an international,
institutionalized committee in whose composition they at least would have a
say (in that the choice of members would be made by a political body, the
Committee of Ministers), than to a group of private, possibly antagonistic,
individuals, selected not by the states themselves or by a political body, but
by the Committee.
Nevertheless, it was recognized that there may be occasions when some
reliance on experts is called for. Thus, the final draft provides that visits are
generally to be carried out by "at least two members of the Committee"8 7
s Convention, Art. 6, para. 2.
s" Original draft, supra note 52, Art. 8, para. 1.

87 Convention, Art. 7, para. 2. See also Explanatory Report, supra note 8, paras. 50, 52 and
53. One reason that only two Committee members are required to take part in visits is that the
drafting bodies were aware of the great number of places that could potentially be visited.
Figures provided to the drafting bodies indicated that the number of penal establishments
alone was extremely high in the various European states: 130 in France, 166 in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 240 in Italy, 83 in Spain, 150 in Switzerland, 125 in the United
Kingdom and 639 in Turkey.
As regards the nationality of the two Committee members who would take part in a visit, the
notion emerged during the drafting process that, if possible, one of them should have the
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and that these members may, if necessary, be "assisted by experts and
interpreters.""8 The possibility of delegating a visit entirely to "other persons" who are not members of the Committee is accordingly excluded,
although the Committee may authorize a visit by only one of its members
where the urgency of a case or some other circumstance so requires. The
Committee is also left free to
choose the most appropriate assistants to
89
supplement its own expertise.
The extent to which the Committee actually makes use of such outside
assistance will naturally depend partly on whether gaps exist in the expertise
of its own members and partly on its eventual workload. Interpreters, at
least, will probably need to be engaged relatively frequently, e,pecially if, as
was suggested by the International Commission of Jurists, the members of
the Committee conducting visits do not include a national of the state
visited.90
To allay any remaining fears of states concerning outside experts, it is
provided that experts act "on the instructions and under the authority of
the Committee." 9 1 Moreover, parties may resist the participation in visits of
particular experts or interpreters to whom they object.9 2 Objection to a
person assisting the Committee may be made both as soon as the state is
notified about who will participate in a visit and during the visit itself. The
reasons envisaged by the draftsmen for such an objection (which are also
reflected in the Explanatory Report) are the manifestation of a biased attitude against the relevant state, the breaking of the rule of confidentiality on
a previous occasion or in the course of the visit, and the making of political
or similar public statements during the visit. Two safeguards against abuses
by states were laid down: (1) resort to objections must be had "exceptionally"; and (2) the Committee is entitled to ask the state for the reasons
nationality of the state to be visited. A number of drafters, as well as the NGOs consulted by the
Committee of Experts, disagreed on this point, on the ground that members might prove
biased or feel psychologically constrained from making a dispassionate assessment in their own
country. The majority, however, took the view that the national member, in addition to
knowing the language, would have firsthand knowledge of the national setting and would
therefore be able to contribute to a balanced appraisal of the conditions of the place visited.
The ECHR opts for this system in regard to the formation of Chambers of the Court. Article
43 of the ECHR, supra note 3, provides:
For the consideration of each case brought before it the Court shall consist of a Chamber
composed of seven judges. There shall sit as an ex officio member of the Ch.mber the judge
who is a national of any State party concerned, or, if there is none, a per.,;on of its choice
who shall sit in the capacity ofjudge ....
s Convention, Art. 7, para. 2; see also Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 51.
89 At the initial stage of the drafting process, it was suggested that the Committee should
have available a "panel" of experts to draw upon on each particular occasion. However, other
drafters expressed the fear that in this way a new structure would be institutionalized alongside
the Committee and that the experts would be given undue weight. In their view, recourse to
outside experts should be exceptional. In the end, no provision was made covering this admittedly very important issue. It is for the Committee, once established, to decide how and on what
basis to draw upon experts.
90 See, however, note 87 supra.
91 Convention, Art. 14, para. 2.
92
Id., Art. 14, para. 3; and Explanatory Report, supra note 8, paras. 83-86.
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behind the objection, "on the understanding that the enquiry and any
response shall be confidential."
Finally, in discharging the functions of the Committee, both its members
and those assisting them are protected by a comprehensive set of privileges
and immunities.9 3
Reporting and Confidentiality
After each visit, the Committee is required to draw up a report setting
forth the facts found during its visit, as well as any recommendations for
improvement it considers necessary to protecting persons in the place visited
from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The
report, together with the recommendations, if any, is then transmitted to
the state concerned. 4 Both the report and all the information gathered by
the Committee in relation to the visit, as well as its follow-up activities, are
required to be kept strictly confidential.95 However, publication of an annual summary report of the Committee's activities, which will entirely respect the confidentiality of information concerning its visits, is envisaged.9 6
Special emphasis is placed by the Convention on confidentiality not only
to "protect" states as much as possible from undue attacks and to gain their
trust, but also to protect the detainees involved. Thus, it is provided that, in
seeking information about persons deprived of their liberty, the "Committee shall have regard to applicable rules of national law and professional
ethics"; 9 7 for example, medical records, prison files and police records must
not be disclosed and pertinent domestic legal restrictions on the disclosure
of information relating to criminal investigation must be observed. The
duty of confidentiality is further strengthened by the provision in the Convention that "no personal data shall be published [by the Committee] without the express consent of the person concerned."9 "
As the success of the Committee depends substantially on its gaining the
trust and confidence of the governments concerned, and in particular on its
gaining access to "restricted" places and information, this principle of confidentiality is clearly a key element in the structure of the Convention. Indeed, it even applies vis-a-vis the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights: the Court's suggestion in 1985 that the Commission and the
Court be provided, where appropriate, with copies of the Committee's reports for the performance of their own functions was not accepted by the
relevant drafting bodies.
The strict confidentiality of its report and of the information collected by
the Committee can only be set aside at the request of the party concerned, 99
9
Id., Art. 10, para. 1.
Convention, Art. 16 and Annex.
I Art. 11, para. I; and Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 76. See also Convention,
Id.,
Art. 13; and Explanatory Report, para. 80.
" Convention, Art. 12. The annual report is to be submitted to the Committee of Ministers
and then transmitted to the Consultative Assembly and made public.
"7 See id., Art. 8, para. 3.
" See id., Art. 11, para. 3.
"' Id., Art. 11, para. 2; and Explanatory Report, supra note 8, para. 77.
"-
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or if the prospects of the Committee's gaining a party's trust and confidence
are considered no longer "realistic": that is, when the party has consistently
failed to cooperate with the Committee or has refused to take steps to
improve the situation in the light of the Committee's recommendations.'
In the latter event, the Convention provides that the Committee, acting
exceptionally by a two-thirds majority, may make a public statement, but
only after giving the party in question an opportunity to explain why it has
failed to cooperate or take the steps recommended.
This power to make a public statement will undoubtedly be perceived as a
kind of sanction to be applied to recalcitrant governments, or at least as a
deterrent to refusals to cooperate. Be that as it may, the Committee will
need to adopt an extremely cautious approach to its use. The whole point of
the Convention is that, as regards the matters it covers, more can be
achieved by discreet contacts than by public exposure and denunciations,
which tend to produce denials rather than improvements. Caution will also
be called for, to avoid giving parties the correlative impression that confidentiality is a reward for cooperation.
Concluding Observations

While a considered appraisal of the Convention will obviously need to
await its actual implementation, some general comments can be made.
First, the Convention is unique among treaties on human rights in that, as
already noted, it contains-no substantive, standard-setting provisions; its sole
function is to establish a mechanism for international supervision' 0 ' of compliance with preexisting standards. This is not to suggest, however, that the
aims of the Convention are modest. On the contrary, the mechanism it
establishes takes the element of supervision substantially further than it had
previously been taken in relation to peacetime human rights. Previous instruments have sought to monitor compliance with the obligations they
create by requiring states to submit reports at predetermined intervals for
examination by international bodies, 10 2 or by providing for a contentious
procedure enabling other parties to the treaty or individuals to make complaints to such bodies." ° 3 With the exception of those under the ECHR and
the American Convention on Human Rights, these procedures are exclusively nonjudicial and lead to a nonbinding recommendation or report.
States have not generally been willing to accept compulsory judicial review
100Convention, Art. 10, para. 2; and Explanatory Report, supra note 8, paras. 74-75.
101For a discussion of the rationale for, and the various methods of, international supervision, see A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DiviDED WORLD 208-1 1, 304-06 and
310-11 (1986).
12 See, e.g., Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 UST 3201, TIAS No. 6418, 266
UNTS 3, Art. 8; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 1, Art. 9; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 51, Art. 16;
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200, supra
note 3, Supp. (No. 16) at 49, Art. 40.
103 See, e.g., the instruments referred to in note 3 supra.
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in this-only recently "internationalized"-sphere. Where they have accepted it, international adjudication has proved valuable but, for reasons
already indicated, not totally effective in securing respect for human rights
obligations.
This should probably not surprise us. It is common knowledge that
human rights obligations are substantially nonreciprocal-that is, states are
not induced to comply with them for fear that other states might otherwise
feel at liberty to disregard them. Even when the right to initiate ex post facto
adjudication is given to individuals and international bodies and not just to
states, we should not expect that it will compel compliance to the same
extent as more reciprocal obligations, where the inherent incentives to
comply are stronger. The prospect of an adverse human rights judgment is
simply not as fearful to states as the continuing threat of retaliatory economic disadvantage that may follow from the breach of a commercial treaty.
In the field of human rights, some form of continuous monitoring or supervision by an autonomous body is called for.
The Convention responds to this need for supervision of the obligations
of states regarding torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and, moreover, applies to those obligations the most advanced and penetrating form
of supervision so far devised. Having an international body actually inspect
places within the jurisdiction of states so as to ascertain their conduct is
clearly much more far-reaching than providing for it merely to examine
data submitted by states themselves or inquire into specific complaints. This
technique also has the advantage of affording an effective method not only
of checking whether a state is respecting or disregarding its international
obligations, but also of forestalling violations, at least before they occur on
any significant scale.
Prior to the adoption of the Convention, this method of supervision had
10 4
largely been confined to the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
where the special nature of the subject matter-in particular, the need to
avoid the diversion of nuclear material to military use-induced states to
accept an especially rigorous method of international scrutiny. As noted, it
had also been applied to certain humanitarian obligations in wartime, as well
as in other fields (with other modalities).' The Convention represents a
104 See, e.g., Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956,8 UST 1093,
TIAS No. 3873, 276 UNTS 3, Art. XII(A)(6); and Convention on the Establishment of a
Security Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Dec. 20, 1957, 351 UNTS 235, Art. 5(a).
Regarding inspection for the purpose of avoiding the release of excessive levels of radioactivity,
see, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Mar.
25, 1957, 298 UNTS 167, Art. 35.
105 See notes 9, 10 and 11 supra. A similar method of supervision, where the "supervisor" is
not an international body but the other party or parties to the relevant treaty, is even more
widely used. See, e.g., Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 UST 794, TIAS No. 4780, 402
UNTS 7 1, Art. 7; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
UST 2410, TIAS No. 6347, 610 UNTS 205, Art. 12; and Treaty on the Elimination of
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, USSR-U.S., S. TREATY Doc.
11, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 27 ILM 90 (1988), Art. 11.
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major innovation in that it applies the technique of supervisory and preventive inspection to peacetime human rights protection.'0 6 By means of its
visits, the Committee will be able to bring relief-not just consolation or
moral support-to otherwise helpless victims and potential victims of torture and other forms of ill-treatment.
The Convention is also a significant step forward in the ongoing process
of "internationalization" of human rights. By ratifying the Convention,
states agree to allow the Committee into their prisons, police stations, juvenile detention centers, psychiatric institutions and all other places where
persons are deprived of their liberty; they agree to expose to the scrutiny of
an international body many sensitive, indeed painful, sphere:; of national
activity. In doing so, they affirm their conviction that "expressions of concern at violations of [human]' 0rights
cannot be considered interference in the
7
domestic affairs of a State.'
Finally, the Convention-seen in the light of its drafting history-affords
a revealing insight into the increasingly valuable role of both NGOs
and the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly in stimulating governments to move forward in protecting human rights. This is a field where
governments are in particular need of prodding, or at least of being set
concrete challenges to greater and greater achievements, as other priorities tend to monopolize their attention. Moreover, the role of these
bodies has not ended with the adoption of the Convention. It is likely that
they will continue to monitor its implementation and, to the extent that
they consider any aspect of the Committee's practice unsatisfactory, to press
for improvements.
On its face, the Convention appears tightly drawn (subject, as indicated,
to a possible concern regarding Article 9), but with flexibility where appropriate. Like all international instruments for the protection of human rights,
it is the outcome of rigorous negotiations between those favoring the progressive development of legal rules designed to safeguard human dignity as
much as possible, and those more concerned with the demands of state
sovereignty. The final result shows that the former eventually got the upper
hand, although in a number of instances they had to accommodate to soiine
extent the requests of the other group. (Some of these instances were mentioned above: the rules on the composition of the Committee, ol its election
and on the role of professional experts.)'
106However, as noted above (see the section "Utility Questioned" and note 34 supra), the
Convention, although primarily concerned with peacetime situations, can also apply in time of
war or during civil strife, to the extent that the ICRC does not "effectively" visit "on a regular
basis"
places where people are deprived of their liberty (see Art. 17, para. 3).
7
11 See Declaration on Human Rights, adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Council of
Europe on July 21, 1986, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, INFORMATION SHEET, No. 20, May-October 1986, at 118.
10sTo highlight the importance of the Convention, one should also recall thz.t in the course
of its drafting, a number of proposals were made with a view to qualifying or seriously limiting
the action of the Committee, or, more generally, to lessening the smoothness olapplication of
the Convention in comparison to the system eventually agreed upon. Even be'ore the actual
drafting started, it was suggested that instead of working out a Convention, a simple recom-
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The text of the Convention, as it now stands, is a courageous attempt at a
novel approach to human rights. Those concerned with human dignity will
no doubt hope that this new European system for preventing torture and
ill-treatment will fulfill a pioneering role by stimulating the establishment of
similar systems elsewhere in the world, so that eventually visits by international committees to all kinds of detainees will come to be as normal, as
accepted and as effective in raising the level of respect for human rights as
ICRC visits to prisoners of war are today.
ANTONIO CASSESE*

THE FORTIETH SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

The International Law Commission of the United Nations held its 40th
session from May 9 to July 29, 1988, under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Leonardo Diaz-Gonzlez. The Commission adopted 6 articles of the
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind and 14
articles on the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses.
Substantial time was devoted to both international liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law and the
status of the diplomatic courier and the diplomatic bag not accompanied by
diplomatic courier. Reports on jurisdictional immunities of states and their
property and state responsibility were introduced by the special rapporteurs
for those topics but were not discussed by the Commission owing to lack of
time. The remaining substantive item on the Commission's agenda, relations between states and international organizations (second part of the
topic), was not considered at this session. Finally, the Commission once
again devoted substantial time to reviewing its procedures and methods
of work.

mendation should be adopted. The following are some of the proposals made at different
stages: that the entering of reservations to the Convention be allowed; that the Committee be
under the control of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers; that the outside experts
to be used by the Committee be proposed by the contracting states; that certain classes of
national institutions be excluded from the application of the Convention; and that under
certain circumstances, the contracting parties be relieved of their obligations under the Convention.
* Professor of International Law and Relations, European University Institute, Florence;
Chairman, Steering Committee for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (1987-1988).
Although the author was a member of the Italian delegation to the two Council of Europe
committees involved in drafting the Convention (Vice Chairman of the one and, later, Chairman of the other), the views expressed here are entirely personal and do not in any way reflect
the position of the Italian Government or of the Council of Europe.
The author wishes to thank for their comments Mr. E. Mose, Legal Adviser, Norwegian
Ministry ofJustice, who in 1985-1986 chaired one of the committees that drafted the Convention, as well as Prof. P. Imbert, Deputy Director, Directorate for Human Rights, Council of
Europe. The outstanding help of Susan Marks in the preparation of this paper is also gratefully
acknowledged.
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Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind
The six articles provisionally adopted by the Commission at the 40th
session complete chapter I-the introductory or "general part" of the
code'-and begin chapter II, which contains the list of crimes. The articles
constituting the remainder of chapter I, Part II: General Principles, provide
as follows:
Article 4
Obligation to try or extradite
1. Any State in whose territory an individual alleged to have committed a crime against the peace and security of mankind is present shall
either try or extradite him.
2. If extradition is requested by several States, special consideration
shall be given to the request of the State in whose territory the crime
was committed.
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article do not prejudge the establishment and the jurisdiction of an international criminal court.
Article

72

Non bis in idem
[1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished for a crime under
this Code for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted
by an international criminal court.]
2. Subject to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this article, no one shall be
liable to be tried or punished for a crime under this Code in respect of
an act for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted by a
national court, provided that, if a punishment was imposed, it has been
enforced or is in the process of being enforced.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2, an individual may
be tried and punished [by an internationa criminal court or] by a
national court for a crime under this Code if the act which was the
subject of a trial and judgement as an ordinary crime corresponds to
one of the crimes characterized in this Code.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2, an individual may
be tried and punished by a national court of another State for a crime
under this Code:
(a) if the act which was the subject of the previous judgement took
place on the territory of that State;
(b) if that State has been the main victim of the crime.
£

At its 39th session, the Commission provisionally adopted Part I, Definition and character-

ization, containing Article I, Definition, and Article 2, Characterization; and the following
articles of part II: Article 3, Responsibility and punishment; Article 5, Non-applicability of
statutory limitations; and Article 6,Judicial guarantees. See the Note on the Commission's 39th
session, 82 AJIL 144, 145-46 (1988).
2

This article appears to be out of numerical order because intervening articles were adopted

at the Commission's 39th session, as explained in note I supra.
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5. In the case of a subsequent conviction under this Code, the court,
in passing sentence, shall deduct any penalty imposed and implemented
as a resul of a previous conviction for the same act.
Article 8
Non-retroactivity
1. No one shall be convicted under this Code for acts committed
before its entry into force.
2. Nothing in this article shall preclude the trial and punishment of
anyone for any act which, at the time when it was committed, was
criminal in accordance with international law or domestic law applicable in conformity with international law.
Article 1O
Responsibility of the superior
The fact that a crime against the peace and security of mankind was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superiors of criminal
responsibility, if they knew or had information enabling them to conclude, in the circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing or was going to commit such a crime and if they did not take all
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the crime.
Article 11
Official position and criminal responsibility
The official position of the individual who commits a crime against
the peace and security of mankind, and particularly the fact that he acts
as Head of State or Government, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility.
One article of Chapter II: Acts Constituting Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, was adopted at the 40th session. It begins Part I,
Crimes against peace, and reads as follows:
Article 12
Aggression
1. Any individual to whom responsibility for acts constituting aggression is attributed under this Code shall be liable to be tried and
punished for a crime against peace.
2. Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations.
3. The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the
Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression
although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter,
s This article appears to be out of numerical order because an intervening article was
adopted at the Commission's 39th session, as explained in note 1supra.
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conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circum-

stances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.

4. [In particular] any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, constitutes an act of aggression, due regard being paid to

paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article:

(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the

territory of another State, or any military occupation, however tempo-

rary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the
use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory
of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the
territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces
of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in
contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement, or any
extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of
the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed
at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein;
(h) Any other acts determined by the Security Council as constituting acts of aggression under the provisions of the Charter.
[5. Any determination by the Security Council as to the existence of
an act of aggression is binding on national courts.]
6. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as in any way enlarging
or diminishing the scope of the Charter of the United Nations including
its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.
7. Nothing in this article could in any way prejudice the right to
self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these
peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in
accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with
the above-mentioned Declaration.
Explanations of the above provisions may be found in the commentaries
contained in the report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the
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work of its 40th session. 4 The following brief observations reflect the author's personal views and do not touch upon many of the important aspects
of these articles.
Article 4 gave rise to controversy within the Commission. As is evident
from its title and text, the article provides for enforcement of the code
through national courts. While paragraph 3 preserves the possibility that an
international court may be established, 5 neither that paragraph nor any
other provision indicates whether the jurisdiction of such a tribunal would
take precedence over that of national courts or would simply coexist with it.
Several members of the Commission expressed reservations about Article
4 on the ground that it failed to establish clear rules of jurisdiction and
extradition. Indeed, the article appears to be based on the assumption that
there would be universal jurisdiction over crimes under the code. Some
members thought this assumption deserved more careful consideration and
pointed out that the whole area ofjurisdiction would have to be reexamined
in light of each individual crime that is eventually included in the code. The
commentary does state that the formulation of more specific rules to implement the general principles set forth in the article will be left until a later
stage of the Commission's work. However, some members of the Commission did not find this statement to be sufficiently reassuring. In their view,
the article itself should have contained general principles concerning jurisdiction and extradition or, at the very least, cross-references to provisions
on those subjects to be included in a subsequent part of the code.
Paragraph 2 of Article 4 was the result of a compromise between
members who believed that preference should be given to the state where
the crime was committed and those who favored a more flexible approach.
The commentary to paragraph 2 admits that, in principle, a list of priorities
should be established to deal with cases in which several requests for extradition are received. But the Commission was unable to do so at this stage of
its work, both because of uncertainties about the role to be played by an
international criminal court and because of controversy within the Commission over priorities among such factors as territoriality, the nationality of
the victim, the "proper administration of justice" and the discretionary
power of the state in whose territory the alleged offender is present.
Article 7 deals with the principle non bis in idem (literally "not twice for the
same"), often referred to in the common law world as the rule against
double jeopardy. As is clear from the text of the article, it is easier to state
the principle in shorthand than to determine just how far it should extend,
" Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fortieth session, 43 UN
GAOR Supp. (No. 10), UN Doc. A/43/10 (1988) (unpublished as of this writing) [hereinafter
Report]. Draft articles quoted in this Note are taken from the draft report, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/L.426/Add.I (1988); their texts will not be changed.
5
The Commission has twice asked the General Assembly whether its mandate to prepare the
code includes the drafting of a statute of an international criminal court, but has to date
received no definitive response. In the view of some members of the Commission, the Assembly's request that the ILC prepare the code is sufficient to give it discretion to decide whether
such a statute should accompany the code, and a separate instruction concerning a court is not
necessary.
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particularly in the international context. Paragraph 1 was placed in brackets
since it is not yet known whether an international criminal court will be
proposed or established. There was some discussion of whether paragraph 1
would apply to regional or other "international criminal courts." It was
generally agreed that such a court would have to be recognized by the
international community of states and by the parties to the code so as to
qualify under paragraph 1.
Paragraphs 2 through 4 of Article 7 deal with the application of the non bis
in idem rule in national courts. The rule stated in paragraph 2 is subject to
the exceptions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4. Whether and to what
extent the rule should be subject to exceptions gave rise to a good deal of
controversy within the Commission. Thus, paragraphs 2 through 4 reflect a
compromise. Paragraph 3 deals with individuals prosecuted under national
law for murder but whose acts constitute genocide under the code. Such an
individual could be prosecuted a "second" time, but for genocide rather
than murder. Paragraph 4 is intended to protect against abuse of the rule.
Specifically, the fear was expressed that a state could protect an individual
by sentencing him to a penalty that was highly disproportionate to the
gravity of the crime but, through operation of the rule in paragraph 2,
would enable him to avoid harsher penalties in another state-in particular,
the state in which the crime was committed or the one that was the main
victim of the crime. It would be open to the latter states to institute further
proceedings against the individual if, in their judgment, the first decision
did not reflect a proper appraisal of the acts or of their seriousness. Some
members were particularly doubtful about the soundness of this
exception,
6
in view of the fundamental nature of the non bis in idem rule.
The principle of nonretroactivity, embodied in Article 8, is an application
of the maxim nullum crinen sine lege and is recognized in various international instruments.7 Paragraph 2 of Article 8 is presaged by the words
"under this Code" in paragraph 1. Thus, for example, an individual who
committed an act of genocide before the entry into force of the code could
thereafter be convicted of that crime, but not "under [the] Code." The
conviction would have to rest on other bases of law, whether conventional
or customary. Indeed, the commentary to the article observes that the
Nuremberg Tribunal based its judgments upon general principles of law,
which it found to have existed before the commission of the acts in question.' Still, one may ask whether paragraph 2 is really necessary. First, the
6

See, e.g., Art. 14, para. 7, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res.
2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), which provides: "No one
shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally
convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country."
7 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A, UN Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948) (Art. 11(2)); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6 (Art.
15(1)); and European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (Art. 7(1)) [hereinafter European Convention].
s Cf. European Convention, supra note 7, Art. 7(2), which provides: "This Article shall not
prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time

when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by
civilised nations."
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way that paragraph 1 is formulated seems to render paragraph 2 redundant.
And second, as formulated, paragraph 2 almost seems to encourage the
kinds of prosecutions it envisages, despite the wide-ranging criticisms of
Nuremberg in this connection, as well as the fact that one of the chief
purposes of the code is to increase legal certainty.
Article 10 was formulated on the basis of Article 86, paragraph 2 of
9
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the law of war.
The article sets forth a rule that was recognized in a number of post-World
War II decisions.' The expression "all feasible measures within their
power" was understood to mean that for superiors to incur responsibility,
they must have had both the legal competence and the actual opportunity to
take measures to prevent the crime.
Precedents for Article 11 may be found in the charters of the international military tribunals established after the Second World War," as well as
in two instruments previously prepared by the Commission: the Principles
of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, adopted in 1950 (Principle
III);I and the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, adopted in 1954 (Article 3).3 The intent of this provision is to
preclude individuals accused of committing a crime under the code from
invoking their official position as a circumstance absolving them from responsibility or conferring immunity, even if it is claimed that the acts in
question were performed in the exercise of their official functions. This
article, like the others, was originally drafted in French. In this author's
view, the English rendering is not felicitous. However, there will be an
opportunity to rectify this deficiency at a later stage.
Chapter II of the code contains the list of acts constituting crimes against
the peace and security of mankind. Deciding which acts to include and how
they should be described is undoubtedly the most difficult and controversial
phase of the Commission's work on the code. As envisioned by the special
rapporteur, chapter II will consist of three main parts: Part I, Crimes against
peace; Part II, War crimes; and Part III, Crimes against humanity.
Part I begins with the most basic and serious crime against peace, that of
aggression. The lack of a generally accepted definition of aggression was the
reason given by the General Assembly in 1954 for postponing further con" Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA

CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 3 (1977).
"oSee, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1946); and decisions of the Tokyo Tribunal,
15 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 73 (1947-49); and 11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, Case No. 7, at 1303 (1948).

" See Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, Art. 7, Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, signed Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 UNTS 279; and Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, amended Apr. 26, 1946, TIAS No. 1589, Art. 6.
12[1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 2 at 374, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.I.
" UN Doc. A/CN.4/85 (1954), 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 9, UN Doc. A/2693 (1954),
reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 112, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1.
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sideration of the draft code at that time."4 The adoption by the Assembly in
1974 of Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the Definition of Aggression"5 cleared
the way for further work on the code. Yet there is not a single reference to
the resolution in the text of draft Article 12. This omission may seem all the
more remarkable in light of the fact that Article 12 substantially reproduces
the text of the resolution. As the commentary explains, however, certain
members pointed to the very different functions of the Security Council, to
which the resolution is addressed, and a court, to which the code is addressed, and concluded that it would be inappropriate for a penal code to
refer to an instrument intended to serve as a guide for a political organ.
There were two schools of thought on this question within the Commission.
One school believed that the respective functions of the judge and the
Security Council were separate and independent, which led to two important conclusions: First, the judge should not be limited to the list of acts in
the definition, but should remain free to characterize other acts as constituting aggression by virtue of the general definition contained in paragraph
2 of Article 12. And second, the judge should not be bound by any decision
of the Security Council determining that an act of aggression had or had not
been committed. Otherwise, work on the code would be pointless. The
other school of thought held that the list of acts is exhaustive, and that the
judge should be bound by any decision of the Security Council concerning
aggression. The judge would be so bound, in their view, since decisions of
the Security Council under chapter VII of the Charter are binding on all
member states and a fortiori on their courts. The members adhering to this
school believed that the entire definition contained in the resolution should
be reproduced in the code.
The text of draft Article 12 reflects an attempt to reach a compromise
between these two positions. It does not contain the entire definition and
leaves some questions in abeyance, as indicated by the brackets in paragraphs 4 and 5. The question of the relationship between an international
criminal court and the Security Council was also left open, as indicated by
the fact that paragraph 5 refers only to national courts.
Non-navigationalUses ofInternationalWatercourses
At its 39th session, the Commission provisionally adopted six articles on
watercourses: 6 Articles 2-5 are contained in Part I, Introduction;1 7 and
Articles 6 and 7 form a portion of Part II, General Principles. The 14
See the Note on the Commission's 35th session in 1983, 78 AJIL 457, 472-73 (1984).
Res. 3314, 29 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974).
the text of these articles, see the Note on the Commission's 39th session, supra note 1,
at 148-50.
17 At its 39th session, the Commission agreed to leave aside for the time being the question of
Article 1, Use of Terms, and that of the use of the term "system," and to continue its work on
the basis of the provisional working hypothesis accepted by the Commission at its 32d (1980)
session. See the Note on the Commission's 35th session, supra note 14, at 476. The word
"system" therefore appears in brackets throughout the text.
'4

'5 GA
16 For
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articles provisionally adopted by the Commission at its 40th session constitute the remainder of part II (Articles 6-10), and the entirety of Part III,
Planned Measures (Articles 11-21). The articles adopted in 1988 provide as
follows:
Article 8
Obligation not to cause appreciableharm
Watercourse States shall utilize an international watercourse [system]
in such a way as not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse
States.
Article 9
General obligation to co-operate
Watercourse States shall co-operate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and mutual benefit in order to attain optimum
utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse
[system].
Article 10
Regular exchange of data and information
1. Pursuant to article 9, watercourse States shall on a regular basis
exchange reasonably available data and information on the condition of
the watercourse [system], in particular that of a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological nature, as well as related forecasts.
2. If a watercourse State is requested by another watercourse State
to provide data or information that is not reasonably available it shall
employ its best efforts to comply with the request but may condition its
compliance upon payment by the requesting State of the reasonable
costs of collecting and, where appropriate, processing such data or
information.
3. Watercourse States shall employ their best efforts to collect and,
where appropriate, to process data and information in a manner which
facilitates its utilization by the other watercourse States to which it is
communicated.
The articles constituting Part III, Planned measures, read as follows:
Article 11
Information concerningplanned measures
Watercourse States shall exchange information and consult each
other on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition of
the watercourse [system].
Article 12
Notification concerningplanned measures with possible adverse effects
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of planned measures which may have an appreciable adverse effect
upon other watercourse States, it shall provide those States with timely
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notification thereof. Such notification shall be accompanied by available technical data and information in order to enable the notified
States to evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures.
Article 13
Periodfor reply to notification
Unless otherwise agreed, a watercourse State providing a notification
under article 12 shall allow the notified States a period of six months
within which to study and evaluate the possible effects of the planned
measures and to communicate their findings to it.
Article 14
Obligations of the notiffing State during the periodfor reply
During the period referred to in article 13 the notifying State shall
co-operate with the notified States by providing them, on request, with
any additional data and information that is available and necessary for
an accurate evaluation, and shall not implement, or permit the implementation of, the planned measures without the consent of the notified
States.
Article 15
Reply to notification
1. The notified States shall communicate their findings to the notifying State as early as possible.
2. If a notified State finds that implementation of the planned measures would be inconsistent with the provisions of articles 6 or 8, it shall
provide the notifying State within the period referred to in article 13
with a documented explanation setting forth the reasons for such
finding.
Article 16
Absence of reply to notification
If, within the period referred to in article 13, the notifying State
receives no communication under paragraph 2 of article 15, it may,
subject to its obligations under articles 6 and 8, proceed with the implementation of the planned measures, in accordance with the notification and any other data and information provided to the notified States.
Article 17
Consultationsand negotiations concerningplanned measures
1. If a communication is made under paragraph 2 of article 15, the
notifying State and the State making the communication shall enter
into consultations and negotiations with a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the situation.
2. The consultations and negotiations provided for in paragraph 1
shall be conducted on the basis that each State must in good faith pay
reasonable regard to the rights and legitimate interests oF the other
State.
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3. During the course of the consultations and negotiations, the notifying State shall, if so requested by the notified State at the time of
making the communication under paragraph 2 of article 15, refrain
from implementing or permitting the implementation of the planned
measures for a period not exceeding six months.
Article 18
Procedures in the absence of notification
1. If a watercourse State has serious reason to believe that another
watercourse State is planning measures that may have an appreciable
adverse effect upon it, the former State may request the latter to apply
the provisions of article 12. The request shall be accompanied by a
documented explanation setting forth the reasons for such belief.
2. In the event that the State planning the measures nevertheless
finds that it is not under an obligation to provide a notification under
article 12, it shall so inform the other State, providing a documented
explanation setting forth the reasons for such finding. If this finding
does not satisfy the other State, the States concerned shall, at the request of that other State, promptly enter into consultations and negotiations in the manner indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17.
3. During the course of the consultations and negotiations, the State
planning the measures shall, if so requested by the other State at the
time it requests the initiation of consultations and negotiations, refrain
from implementing or permitting the implementation of those measures for a period not exceeding six months.
Article 19
Urgent implementation of planned measures
1. In the event that the implementation of planned measures is of
the utmost urgency in order to protect public health, public safety or
other equally important interests, the State planning the measures may,
subject to articles 6 and 8, immediately proceed to implementation, notwithstanding the provisions of article 14 and paragraph 3 of
article 17.
2. In such cases, a formal declaration of the urgency of the measures
shall be communicated to the other watercourse States referred to in
article 12 together with the relevant data and information.
3. The State planning the measures shall, at the request of the other
States, promptly enter into consultations and negotiations with them in
the manner indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17.
Article 20
Data and information vital to national defence or security
Nothing contained in articles 10 to 19 shall oblige a watercourse
State to provide data or information vital to its national defence or
security. Nevertheless, that State shall co-operate in good faith with the
other watercourse States with a view to providing as much information
as possible under the circumstances.
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Article 21
Indirect procedures
In cases where there are serious obstacles to direct contacts between
watercourse States, the States concerned shall proceed to any exchange
of data and information, notification, communication, consultations
and negotiations provided for in articles 10 to 20 through any indirect
procedure accepted by them.
Detailed explanations of these provisions, together with indications of
illustrative supporting authorities, may be found in the commentaries to the
articles in the Commission's report to the General Assembly."8 As with the
draft code, the following observations reflect the author's personal views
and do not purport to cover all important aspects of these articles.
Article 8 is one of the two most fundamental provisions of the draft, the
other being Article 6 on equitable and reasonable utilization. Article 8 is a
specific application of the principle of the harmless use of territory, expressed in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, itself a reflection of
the sovereign equality of states. While the applicability of this general principle to international watercourses was not seriously disputed within the
Commission, efforts to arrive at a generally acceptable formulation of the
article revealed several points on which there were differences of views. The
first of these was the relationship between Articles 6 and 8-i.e., whether a
use that would otherwise be wrongful under Article 8 could be justified on
the ground that it was "equitable" under Article 6. This question was
answered in the negative. The Commission took the view that Articles 6 and
8 should be considered to be complementary but that, prima facie at least, a
use that caused appreciable harm would not be equitable. At the same time,
the Commission recognized that the achievement of an equitable allocation
of the uses and benefits of an international watercourse will, in some cases,
necessitate the toleration by watercourse states of a measure of harm. In
these cases, the necessary accommodations are to be arrived at through
specific agreements.
A second issue raised by Article 8 was whether states would be strictly
liable for its violation, or liable only on the basis of fault. Most members of
the Commission appeared to accept that violation of Article 8 would engage
the international responsibility of the state in question-i.e., that such a
violation would constitute an "internationally wrongful act," as that expression is defined and elaborated upon in the Commission's draft on the law of
state responsibility. 9 The view was expressed, however, that a watercourse
state could be strictly liable for violating the article. The Commission's
commentary is silent on this point, chiefly because of what seemed to be tacit
agreement that problems relating to the standard of liability should be
resolved in connection with the Commission's work on other topics, notably
state responsibility and, in particular, international liability for the injurious
1s See

Report, supra note 4.

19See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-fifth
session, 28 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 3, 17-23, UN Doc. A/9010/Rev.1 (1974).
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consequences of nonprohibited acts. This same issue may well arise in relation to a later article on the obligation of watercourse states not to cause
appreciable pollution harm.
A third and final issue raised by Article 8 concerned the adjective "appreciable." While this term (or its equivalent in other languages) is employed in numerous agreements, some members of the Commission-for
different reasons-regarded it as being inappropriate for use in Article 8.
The appropriate qualifier was "substantial" according to some members,
but others held that the term "harm" should not be qualified at all. However, the Commission had employed "appreciable" as a criterion in Articles
4 and 5, and most members accepted that some qualification of "harm" was
necessary so that minor or insignificant harm would not fall under Article 8.
Articles 9 and 10 were not controversial and call for no particular comment. While Article 10 concerns the regular exchange of data and information, an ongoing process, the articles in part III deal with the provision of
information regarding measures planned by a watercourse state. Unlike the
remaining provisions in part III, Article 11 requires consultation and the
exchange of information about both positive and negative potential effects
of planned measures. Article 12 introduces a set of articles containing procedural rules applicable when a state is planning measures that may have an
appreciable adverse effect upon other watercourse states. The intent of
these articles is to assist states in maintaining an equitable balance between
their respective uses of a watercourse and thus to help avoid disputes concerning new uses (or changes in existing ones).
The procedures contained in Articles 12 to 20 function essentially in the
following way: A state planning measures that, in its judgment, may have an
appreciable adverse effect upon other watercourse states is to provide those
states with timely notification of its plans. Unless otherwise agreed, a notified state has 6 months within which to evaluate the possible effects of the
planned measures and to communicate its findings to the notifying state.
During this period, the notifying state may not proceed to implement its
plans without the consent of the notified state. If the notified state finds that
implementation of the planned measures would result in a violation of
Articles 6 (equitable utilization) or 8 (no appreciable harm), the states concerned must enter into consultations and negotiations with a view to resolving the situation equitably. At the request of the notified state, the implementation of the project must be suspended for an additional 6 months to
permit meaningful discussions. If the notifying state receives no "negative"
reply within the initial 6-month period, it may proceed with its plans. A state
that learns of another state's plans but receives no such notification may set
in motion the foregoing procedures by requesting the latter state to apply
the provisions of Article 12-i.e., to determine whether the measures may
have an appreciable adverse effect upon other watercourse states. If the
determination is negative but is not accepted by the other state, the states
are to enter into consultations and negotiations and, at the request of the
potentially affected state, implementation of the plans is to be suspended for
6 months.
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Articles 19 and 20 contain special provisions on the urgent implementation of planned measures and sensitive information, respectively. It bears
emphasizing that Article 19 deals with those extraordinary instances in
which measures have been planned but their implementation is urgently
required. The article thus does not deal with emergency measures, which
will be covered in a later part of the draft. Finally, Article 21 is addressed to
those exceptional (but, unfortunately, not unheard-of) cases in which direct
contacts cannot be established between the watercourse states concerned. It
allows such states to fulfill their obligations under part III through such
indirect contacts as have been accepted by them.
These articles are noteworthy principally because they represent acceptance by the Commission of the principles of prior notification, consultation
and negotiation in relation to new uses, or "planned measures." The procedures they lay down are not perfect and cannot be said to reflect general
international law in all of their details. Yet they are the result of long and
careful efforts by the Commission to arrive at a set of rules that have a basis
in state practice and that develop the law of international watercourses
progressively by striking a fair balance between the interests and positions of
states planning the measures and those potentially affected by them.
In addition to its work on Articles 8-21, the Commission devoted a
number of meetings to discussing the fourth report of the special rapporteur, the present author. That report contains a draft article on the exchange of data and information (which was adopted, with some modification, as Article 10), as well as three draft articles on the subtopic of environmental protection, pollution and related matters. Two of the three
last-mentioned articles were referred to the Drafting Committee, which
presumably will consider them at the Commission's 1989 session. The third,
concerning "pollution or environmental emergencies," will be revised by
the special rapporteur for inclusion in a general article on water-related
incidents and emergencies.
The progress made on this topic at the 1988 session should enable the
Commission to meet its goal of completing the first reading of the articles on
watercourses by the end of its current mandate (1991).
The DiplomaticCourier and Bag

As of the time that the Commission considered this topic, comments had
been received from only 29 governments 2 on the complete set of draft
articles adopted on first reading in 1986.21 Further complicating the task of
the special rapporteur, Professor Alexander Yankov, was the fact that most
of these comments were submitted after the deadline of January 1, 1988.
The Commission nonetheless decided to begin the second reading of the
20

The comments are contained in UN Doc. A/CN.4/409 and Corrs.1-2 and Adds.1-5

(1988).
21 For the text, see Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-

eighth session, [1986] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 2 at 24, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1986/
Add.1 [hereinafter 1986 Report].
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draft articles, on the basis of the special rapporteur's eighth report. While
the reasons for this decision are not articulated in the Commission's report,
they probably include the facts (1) that, in the special rapporteur's judgment, comments had been received from a sufficiently representative sample of governments to provide the Commission with a sound basis for the
second reading; and (2) that the Commission had hoped to complete the
second reading of these draft articles in 1988. As a result of the late receipt
of comments, the latter goal will have to be moved back by at least a year.
The 1988 report states that the Commission will "concentrate" on this topic
in 1989, a decision that should permit the virtual completion of the second
reading in that year.
On the basis of suggestions made by governments in their comments, the
special rapporteur proposed that several articles be revised, merged with
other articles or deleted. While comments were made in the Commission on
virtually every article, debate focused principally on the following provisions: Article 2, Scope of the present articles; Article 17, Inviolability of the
temporary accommodation; Article 18, Immunity from jurisdiction; and
Article 28, Protection of the diplomatic bag.
The issue concerning Article 2 was whether international organizations
and national liberation movements should be included within the scope of
the articles. Some members favored extending their scope to include international organizations of a universal character, within the meaning of the
1975 Vienna Convention on the representation of states in their relations
with such organizations. 22 Other members pointed out that the status of the
couriers and bags of such organizations is already regulated, principally by
the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and
that on the specialized agencies, as well as by many headquarters agreements. Most members felt that it would be inadvisable to include national
liberation movements since extending the scope of the draft to cover such
groups could seriously jeopardize its acceptability. It was also pointed out
that those movements are essentially temporary in nature and would later
be subsumed into state structures.
Opinion on Article 17 was divided: while some members regarded the
inviolability of the courier (under Article 16) as being dependent upon the
inviolability of his accommodation, others considered the article as unnecessary and unduly burdensome for transit and receiving states. Article 18 gave
rise to some controversy, although most members seemed to support the
concepts of absolute immunity of the courier from criminal jurisdiction,
qualified (official acts) immunity from civil jurisdiction and immunity from
most measures of execution in civil matters. Some members believed that
the article goes too far and several proposed deleting it or parts of it.
12The

1975 Convention defines "international organizations of a universal character" in its

Article 1 as "the United Nations, its specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy
Agency and any similar organization whose membership and responsibilities are on a worldwide scale." Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with
International Organizations of a Universal Character, openedfor signature Mar. 14, 1975, UN
Doc. A/CONF.67/16, reprinted in 69 AJIL 730 (1975).
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By far the most important and controversial provision of the draft is
Article 28. The main features of the article originally proposed by the
special rapporteur were the concept of "inviolability" and a prohibition on
examining the bag "directly or through electronic or other technical devices." The notion of inviolability of the bag was criticized on the following
grounds, inter alia: there is no precedent for it in existing conventions, its
implications are uncertain and it could impede efforts to prevent abuse of
the bag. Similar criticisms were directed at the prohibition of examination,
which was further said to raise possible inconsistencies with Article 35,
paragraph 3 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.23 The
latter provision allows authorities of the receiving state to request that the
bag be opened in their presence by a representative of the sending state if
they have serious reason to believe that the bag contains something other
than official correspondence and documents or articles intended exclusively
for official use. A variety of reformulations have been proposed by governments and members of the Commission, some of which incorporate a provision along the lines of Article 35(3) of the Vienna Convention.
At the conclusion of the discussion the Commission decided to refer all 33
articles to the Drafting Committee, together with the proposals made by the
special rapporteur and members of the Commission. The Drafting Committee will probably devote a considerable amount of time to these articles
at the next session, which will put the Commission in a good position to
complete the second reading of the draft in 1989. The special rapporteur
has recommended that the draft should ultimately become the basis of a
convention-one that would be a distinct legal instrument rather than a
protocol to an existing convention. Since the final versions of some of the
articles (in particular, Article 28) may be inconsistent with the provisions of
one or more existing conventions, assuring compatibility between the draft
and those conventions may be a difficult task for the Commission.
JurisdictionalImmunities ofStates and their Property
This is the other topic that was completed by the Commission on first
reading in 1986.24 Governments were invited to submit their comments on
the draft articles by January 1, 1988-the same deadline as given for the
courier and bag. By the time it took up jurisdictional inmmunities, the Commission had received replies from only 28 governments-virtually the same
number as had made comments on the draft on the courier and bag-and
most of these were submitted belatedly. The lateness and meager number of
responses may have been due to the fact that states-many of which have
small and already busy legal staffs-had to prepare and submit comments
on what amount to two draft conventions by the same date. If the Commission should again complete the first reading of drafts on two topics in the
23

24

Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, TIAS No. 6820, 596 UNTS 261.
For the text, see the Commission's 1986 Report, supra note 21, at 8.
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same year (a possibility that is not entirely unlikely2"), it may wish to consider

giving governments more time for comment or deferring the transmittal of
one of the drafts until sufficient time has been allowed for states to comment
on the other.
The new special rapporteur for jurisdictional immunities, Ambassador
Motoo Ogiso, submitted a preliminary report analyzing the comments available to him at the time-to wit, those of 25 governments-and proposed

the reformulation of certain articles on the basis of those comments. Unfortunately, the Commission had time to hear only the introduction of the

report; discussion of the report and the special rapporteur's proposals was
deferred until 1989. The Commission decided that it would "concentrate"

on jurisdictional immunities in 1990, which presumably means that, after
discussion of the preliminary report in 1989, sufficient time will be allocated

to the Drafting Committee in 1990 for its consideration of the draft articles.
It is thus possible that the Commission could complete the second reading of
this topic in 1990.
InternationalLiabilityfor Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibitedby InternationalLaw
As already noted, the Commission devoted substantial time to the consideration of this topic. The basis of discussion was the fourth report of the
special rapporteur, Ambassador Julio Barboza, which contained ten draft
articles arranged in two chapters. 6 In addition to the usual provisions on
scope (Article 1) and use of terms (Article 2), Chapter I, General Provisions,
contains articles on "Attribution" (Article 3), "Relationship between the
present articles and other international agreements" (Article 4) and "Absence of effect upon other rules of international law" (Article 5). The five
articles contained in Chapter II, Principles, are entitled "Freedom of action
and the limits thereto" (Article 6), "Co-operation" (Article 7), "Participation" (Article 8), "Prevention" (Article 9) and "Reparation" (Article 10).
After discussing the report, the Commission decided to refer the ten
articles to the Drafting Committee. This action represents a major step
forward in the work on this topic, which the Commission first included in its
program of work in 1978. The Commission has been endeavoring ever
since to come to at least a general understanding as to its scope. While it can
by no means be said that such an understanding has now been reached, most
possibilities have been thoroughly ventilated and the time seems to have
come to get down to the business of focusing upon concrete proposals. This
the Commission will be forced to do now that articles have been referred to
the Drafting Committee.
2 The Commission's report reiterates intentions expressed in 1987 concerning work on the

draft code and international watercourses, namely, that it would endeavor to complete the first
reading of both drafts by 1991.
6 These proposed articles are set forth in chapter II of the Commission's Report, supra
note 4.
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During the Commission's discussion of the fourth report, a basic division
emerged between those members who believed that the topic should be
confined to activities that create a risk of transboundary harm and those
who thought it should cover the entire field of international liability for
transboundary harm. While the former would base the topic upon risk, the
latter focused upon harm and believed that risk should not play such a
predominant role. The distinction has important implications for the extent
to which the draft emphasizes prevention over reparation, anticipatory procedures of notice and consultation over post hoc obligations of compensation.
State Responsibility
As with jurisdictional immunities, the Commission had time only to hear
the new special rapporteur, Professor Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, introduce his
preliminary report. Its discussion was deferred until the next session. The
preliminary report indicated the approach the new special rapporteur intends to take to the remaining aspects of the topic. First, he reexamined
Articles 6 and 7 of part II, which are currently before the Drafting Committee. Second, he proposed to deal separately with the legal consequences
of international "delicts" and "crimes." Third, the chapters dealing with
delicts and crimes would treat both "substantive" (e.g., cessation and various forms of reparation) and "procedural" (e.g., the right of the injured
state to take measures designed to secure cessation or reparation) consequences of those two kinds of internationally wrongful acts. Finally, any
rules on dispute settlement dealt with in part III of the draft would be
separate from those on the conditions an injured state must fulfill before
resorting to countermeasures. The latter would form an integral part of
part II (on the consequences of an internationally wrongful act), and part III
would cover only dispute settlement. These fresh ideas should provoke an
interesting debate at the next session and may help the Commission to speed
up its work on state responsibility.
Program, Proceduresand Working Methods
The Commission again devoted a considerable amount of time to discussing its program and methods of work. Many new ideas were presented and
practices of long standing examined. Discussions, mostly off the record,
were frank and constructive, covering such topics as planning, the future
program of work, methods of work, the duration of the session and documentation. Not surprisingly, perhaps, there is a degree of resistance to
change in the Commission, as in most institutions. Moreover, the current
financial crisis of the United Nations forecloses many options. But Commission members are certainly aware of the need to streamline the Commission's working methods and are determined to take positive steps to that
end. Some of the steps already taken, modest though they may be, are
outlined in the Commission's 1988 report.
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If the Commission is able to meet its goals of completing the second
reading of two drafts by 1989 and 1990, respectively, and the first reading
of two other drafts by 1991, some pressure to add new topics to its agenda
may be expected. In its report, the Commission records its conviction that
shortening its agenda would be conducive to increased productivity-suggesting that the Commission, at least, would prefer not to add a new topic to
its agenda each time it completes work on one. Nonetheless, the Commission decided that at its next session it will establish a small working group to
be entrusted with proposing topics for inclusion in the long-term program
of work. It is envisioned that the working group will meet during the 1989
and 1990 sessions and that the topics it identifies will be considered for
inclusion in the Commission's active agenda at some appropriate time in the
future.
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